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I NTRODUCTION
Picture two families receiving housing benefits from the federal
government. The families are identically structured (two parents, three kids)
but one is poor and one is rich. The first family has waited years on a waiting
list to get the benefit and has had to share extensive personal information
about the family and its history in the application process. Once receiving the
benefit, the family members find themselves subject to a myriad of rules,
police and administrative inspections of their home and nearly constant
harassment by public and private actors, all stemming from receipt of the
benefit. They risk exposure to child protective and criminal justice
interventions in their family and can easily suffer the consequences of that
exposure. The second family also receives a housing subsidy but the
experience is quite different. This family fills out a form once a year and
receives a yearly payment. There is no waiting list and nothing else happens.
For that family, the scrutiny and risks faced by the first family are
unthinkable. This is the state of U.S. social welfare provision. Both the poor
and the rich receive extensive social welfare benefits, but the poor suffer
scrutiny and punishment while the rich experience benefits that are almost
invisible. And in fact, as one moves from benefits for the poor to benefits for
the rich, one can trace a linear progression from highly invasive and punitive
administrative systems to systems that function as near entitlements.
Since at least the 1970s a variety of scholars have sought to redefine
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the U.S. social welfare state to include not only traditional benefit programs
(for example welfare and Social Security) but also a variety of tax benefits
that are “hidden”1 or “submerged”2 forms of “Welfare for the Wealthy.”3
Including these benefits in the overall picture of U.S. social welfare
provision reveals a system that is both larger in size than popularly believed
and that, in addition to providing some support for the poor, distributes
significant benefits regressively, to households with substantial wealth.
Although a variety of scholars and policy analysts have described these
policy outcomes, scholars have yet to focus on the ways in which structural
inequality is written directly into the means of administration of U.S. social
welfare programs. This article is the first to turn to those questions and to
systematically demonstrate that those who are economically (and
disproportionately racially) disadvantaged are offered (or perhaps it is better
to say subject to) a social welfare state that is meager, punitive and
tremendously risky for those who receive its benefits. But for those with
economic privilege, the story is quite different. Families and individuals with
significant economic privilege benefit disproportionately from a whole host
of cash and near-cash benefits that are neither meager nor punitive. In fact, in
contrast to benefits for the poor, benefits for the rich function as nearly
invisible entitlements. As one moves from benefits for the poor towards
benefits for the rich, the administrative structures become less and less
punitive and risky and more and more like invisible entitlements. Although
as a formal matter the rich, like the poor, have no right to economic support
in the constitutional sense, American social welfare policy moves the rich
remarkably close to a right to economic support, leaving the poor far behind.
Before going further, it is important to be very clear about the
article’s purpose. Its purpose is neither to derogate the provision of social
welfare support nor to argue for its abolishment. In contrast, this article joins
and supports crucial calls for the establishment of what Martha Fineman has
termed a responsive state.4 To this end, the article reveals vast structural
1.
CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1997).
2.
SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 16–17 (2011).
3.
CHRISTOPHER G. FARICY, WELFARE FOR THE WEALTHY: PARTIES,
SOCIAL SPENDING AND INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2015).
4.
See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES,
GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004); Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring
Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive
State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State].
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inequalities in the means of administration of public benefits and argues that,
if we are to reach the responsive state that so many now call for, we need
first to understand these administrative inequalities and then to institute a
truly progressive social welfare state. This welfare state would be not only
larger and more progressively distributed but would also be administered to
support rather than subordinate those at the bottom of the income scale.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief theoretical
grounding for the article, locating it within academic conversations about the
way in which inequality is structured in contemporary forms of governance.
Part II joins a growing literature redefining the contours of social welfare
provision to include three analytically and programmatically distinct parts:
poverty-based support, social insurance, and tax policies that function as
social welfare spending. This literature reveals the social welfare state as one
that is much larger than usually described and that targets inequality much
less effectively than one might assume. Part III builds on that foundation and
presents the central contribution of this article: not only does the U.S.
welfare state fail to meaningfully address income inequality and poverty but
it significantly exacerbates it through the means of administration. In a
phenomenon I have previously termed hyperregulation, in poverty-focused
benefits the “mechanisms of social support are targeted, by race, class,
gender and place, to exert punitive social control over [disproportionately]
poor, African-American women, their families and their communities.” 5
These mechanisms stand in sharp contrast to the mechanisms of those
benefits that flow to those with economic privilege. Focusing on benefits
administration targeting the bottom, the middle, and the top of the income
scale, this Part traces the move from hyperregulation to near entitlement that
characterizes benefits administration across class. The discussion of housing
support provides examples at the bottom (such as Section 8) and the top
(interest on home mortgages and other housing related tax benefits) whereas
support for dependent children from means-tested benefits like welfare to the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to the Child Tax Credit (CTC) provides a
view of administration from the bottom to the middle of the income scale.
Finally, Part IV returns to the theoretical grounding for this article and argues
that, in order to build a responsive state, the United States must not only
5.
Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty
and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 319 (2014). The term “hyperregulation” is
derived from Loïc Wacquant’s framing of the carceral state as characterized not by
mass but by hyperincarceration. The prefix hyper, in both formulations, is meant to
suggest the means by which systems collectively target communities by race, class,
and place. Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist
America, 139 DAEDALUS 74, 78–79 (2010). See also KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON,
CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
1 (2011).
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enlarge and more progressively distribute welfare benefits, but it must also
structure benefits at the bottom far more like benefits at the top: as programs
that enhance the autonomy of benefit recipients.

I. S TRUCTURING I NEQUALITY : A B RIEF T HEORETICAL
C ONTEXT
A central task of critical scholarship is to investigate and describe the
ways that the state is active in its role in perpetuating and at times
exacerbating the vast economic inequality that characterizes American
society. Thus, this body of scholarship identifies ways that the state is active
in creating and exacerbating inequality, subordinating those at the bottom
and structuring and reinforcing the privileges of select market and family
actors at the top. Turning the inquiry toward the structures (rather than the
actors) helps us move past notions of intentional discrimination and toward a
way to unmask systems that privilege some and subordinate others.
The work of Loïc Wacquant in many ways epitomizes those who
critique the state as actively promoting structures that subordinate. In
Punishing the Poor, Wacquant argues that current governance systems are
characterized by what he describes as two arms of the state—welfare
services on the one hand and criminal justice administration on the other.6
Wacquant describes these arms as working in tandem to control those on the
bottom of the labor market. Focusing in particular here on welfare and its
relationship to the criminal justice administration, Wacquant argues that,
[T]his cyclical dynamic of expansion and contraction of
public aid has been superseded by a new division of the
labor of nomination and domination of dependent
populations that couples welfare services and criminal
justice administration under the aegis of the same
behaviorist and punitive philosophy. The activation of
disciplinary programs applied to the unemployed, the
indigent, single mothers, and others “on assistance” so as to
push them onto the peripheral sectors of the employment
market, on the one side, and the deployment of an extended
police and penal net . . . on the other side, are the two
components of a single apparatus for the management of
poverty that aims at effecting the authoritarian rectification
of the behaviors of populations recalcitrant to the emerging

6.
LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009).
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economic and symbolic order.7
Wacquant thus insists that the U.S. social welfare state operates as
one of two interlocked systems that work together to discipline those who
threaten the current economic order. 8 In his terms, “workfare” and
“prisonfare” are inextricably linked. 9 In addition, in both welfare and
criminal justice, there is no question that the subject of control is raced, both
actually and as a matter of symbolic ordering.10
While these systems may or may not be operated by actors who
express or even intend to function in discriminatory ways, in many ways,
questions of intentionality miss the point of the analysis. The question is not
whether the actors imbedded within these systems or even those who
participate in their design mean to discriminate. They may well and likely in
many circumstances do, but here the inquiry is different. If the administrative
systems result in discriminatory effects, privileging some and subordinating
others, what are the mechanisms by which structural discrimination is
effectuated? In the words of Dorothy Roberts, this analysis helps “elucidate
how state mechanisms of surveillance and punishment work to penalize the
most marginalized . . . in our society while blaming them for their own
7.
WACQUANT, supra note 6, at 14. This passage implicitly references
the earlier work of Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward; for a discussion of
Wacquant’s work in relationship to Piven and Cloward, see Bach, supra note 5, at
334–35.
8.
Wacquant genders the two systems (penal and social welfare) female
and male, respectively. WACQUANT, supra note 6, at 14–15. Although this article
does not focus on the question of the gender of the penal arm as Wacquant describes
it, the gendering of the penal system as male is problematic in its elision of one of
the fastest growing incarcerated populations, poor women of color. For a broad
ranging discussion of the implications of this trend, see Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Overpoliced and Underprotected: Women, Race and Criminalization, 9 UCLA J.
SCHOLARLY PERSP. 23 (2013). As described by Crenshaw, “[m]ore than simply
adding women of color into the mix, this symposium interrogates the terms by which
women are situated both within the discourse of mass incarceration as well as within
various systems that overlap and that contribute to the vulnerability of racially
marginalized women.” Kimberlé Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass
Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race and Social Control, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1422 (2012).
9.
WACQUANT, supra note 6, at 79.
10. For one of the most salient discussion of race and criminal justice, see
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010), which shows that the criminal justice system and its
associated civil feeder and post-incarceration classification systems to strip black
communities of their freedom and of fundamental citizenship privileges and to
recreate, in Alexander’s terms, a New Jim Crow.
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disadvantaged positions. This systemic intersection naturalizes social
inequality and obscures the need for social change.”11 These mechanisms can
be understood as part and parcel of what I have previously called the
hyperregulatory state—a set of “mechanisms of social support [that] are
targeted, by race, class, gender and place, to exert punitive social control
over [disproportionately] poor, African-American women, their families and
their communities.”12
In addition, scholars have persuasively argued that the structures of
current domestic social welfare policy (and governance more broadly) do not
only function to subordinate. They also privilege. As Martha McClusky
explains, “neoliberalism embraces a racialized, genderized, and class-biased
vision of social equity and community solidarity that favors the interests of
the most privileged members of society.”13 Crucially, the state favors those
interests not only by undermining the interests of those who are not favored
but by actively enabling the interests of privileged actors. And it does so
through the seemingly neutral concepts, in the case McClusky describes, of
efficiency and moral hazard. McClusky unmasks the central efficiency
arguments of neoliberalism by asking a crucial question: efficient for whom?
McClusky admonishes supporters of the welfare state to stop ceding
intellectual ground:
[D]efenders of welfare should challenge the double standard
underlying the neoliberal double bind, and the hierarchical
vision of citizenship it both obscures and promotes. This
double standard identifies some people’s interests in
increasing their share of the pie as part of an efficient and
naturalized market that benefits the public, while others’
interests in increasing their share of the pie are instead
labeled redistributive, and therefore potentially harmful to
the public well-being.14
As McClusky demonstrates, the idea that the provision of social
welfare to the poor is “inefficient” and results in “moral hazard” is entirely
dependent on whose interests are centered. So for example, if the central
good being promoted is participation in the low-wage labor market then the
provision of welfare is inefficient. Welfare is both inefficient and creates a
11. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1476 (2012).
12. See Bach, supra note 5, at 329.
13. Martha McClusky, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State 78 IND. L.J. 783, 785 (2003).
14. Id. at 806.
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moral hazard by enabling and perhaps incentivizing recipients to stay out of
the market. But if one redefines the social goal as promoting a society in
which jobs provide a living wage, welfare starts to look different. In that
frame, by providing economic support, welfare is efficient and creates a
moral benefit by strengthening the bargaining position of poor workers and
incentivizing employers to provide a living wage. Turning to another
example, that of tax cuts, McClusky draws a contrast between the societal
approbation for welfare on the one hand and the support for tax cuts for the
wealthy on the other. For McClusky, these are, ultimately moral rather than
economic judgments. “By identifying welfare recipients’ gains as inefficient
moral hazard and tax cuts for the wealthy as promoting an efficient market,
[scholars] implicitly [affirm] a citizenship vision in which the poor have
subordinate moral status.15
So in this view one should actively challenge these seemingly
neutral concepts and look carefully at how particular state mechanisms
function to privilege and subordinate interests. McClusky’s analysis also
suggests that, rather than continuing to look solely at state structures that
function to subordinate (thus Wacquant’s focus on the right and left arm of
the state and my own focus on the mechanisms of the Hyperregulatory State)
we also need to look at the structures that elevate or sustain privilege. It is to
that task that Parts II and III turn.

II. T HE U.S. S OCIAL W ELFARE S YSTEM : A L ARGE AND
T RIFURCATED S YSTEM THAT F AILS M EANINGFULLY TO
A DDRESS I NCOME I NEQUALITY
In popular culture, the benefits we collectively think about when we
think about “welfare” are means tested and heavily stigmatized. Programs
like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, (formerly AFDC),
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (formerly Food Stamps), public housing,
and Section 8 dominate the national conversation about poverty and social
welfare provision.16 However, these benefits are hardly the only kinds of
15. Id. at 832. In this passage McClusky is specifically critiquing the
work of Anthony Giddens as an example of the limitations of various communitarian
visions of citizenship. For the purposes of brevity I have changed the quotation to
refer to “scholars.”
16. The tenure and dominance of this cultural obsession is perhaps best
highlighted by the continued state legislative and popular culture focus on TANF.
TANF is, at this point, one of the smallest federal social welfare social welfare
programs, see infra Part III.B.4.a. Nevertheless, it is a major focus of state legislative
proposals. Take for example state initiatives to drug test TANF applicants.
Numerous studies have revealed that these programs are both costly and ineffective.
For example, during the period in which Florida implemented suspicionless drug
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programs we have. They are, in fact, one of three distinct categories of public
social welfare provision that comprise the publicly provided, U.S. social
welfare state. The three, for the purposes of this article are (1) means-tested,
non-tax based benefits that individuals only receive if they fall below a
particular income threshold, (2) social insurance benefits for retirees, their
spouses and dependents and for some disabled individuals, and (3) benefits
that flow from what Suzanne Mettler has termed the “submerged state”—
benefits like tax expenditures, students loans and parts of Medicare, that flow
largely invisibly to individuals and families through the tax code and other
support programs.17
testing, only 2.67% of applicants who agreed to the drug test tested positive for
controlled substances. Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772
F.3d 1352, 1367 (2014). Similarly, in a recent test run in Michigan, no recipients
tested positive. Ryan Felton, Michigan's Drug-testing Welfare Program has Yielded
Zero Positive Results So Far, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/21/michigan-welfare-drug-testingprogram. According to one report, in 2015 ten states spent $850,909.25 on these
programs, yielding only 321 positive drug tests. Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, Drug
Testing Welfare Recipients is a Popular New Policy that Cost States Millions. Here
Are the Results, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/drugtesting-welfare-recipients-is-a-popular-new-policy-that-cost-states-millions-here-arethe-cf829257ade0#.vbdlvic54. In addition, numerous appellate courts have ruled that
these programs violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1377;
Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the decision of
the District Court ruling the program unconstitutional). Despite these facts, in recent
years in each legislative session multiple states have introduced legislation requiring
drug testing of welfare recipients with 28 proposals in 2012, 29 in 2012, 18 in 2014,
18 in 2015 and 17 in 2016. Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public
Assistance,
NAT’L
CONF.
S T.
LEGISLATURES
(Mar.
27,
2017),
www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx.
17. This trifurcation of benefits programs represents a shift in the
literature. Traditionally, when talking about social welfare programs, scholars talked
about bifurcation between means-tested benefits and social insurance. Work of
scholars like Michael Katz (see citations infra note 18) and Theda Skocpol (e.g.,
Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective
(1995)) are characteristic. However, beginning at least with the work of Christopher
Howard, supra note 1, scholars turned their attention to what Suzanne Mettler calls
the submerged state. METTLER, supra note 2. As discussed in more detail below,
these categories are imperfect in a variety of ways. For example, some means-tested
benefits, like the EITC, are means-tested but share many administrative
characteristics of submerged state programs. Similarly, while social insurance
benefits are a significant form of economic assistance flowing to the middle, the
middle and the bottom also benefit from programs within the submerged state. In
addition, for ease of analysis, these categories leave out some significant income
transfer programs, including unemployment and worker’s compensation. Despite
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Although the history of U.S. social welfare programs has been well
told elsewhere, 18 to understand the parameters of social support, it is
important to begin with a little bit of that history. Although one can trace
earlier roots,19 the structure of two parts of the current U.S. social welfare
state originated primarily from a set of bargains struck during the New Deal.
During this period, public social welfare spending was, in effect, split into
two parts. On one side was social insurance for those who had, proverbially,
paid into the system and on the other side were means-tested benefits for
those in poverty.20 This split was originally epitomized, during the New
Deal, by the establishment of Old Age Insurance on the one hand, and Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) on the other. At the start, ADC was
conceptualized and implemented as a small program designed to meet the
needs of white widows whereas Old Age Insurance was designed to meet the
needs of white male retirees. These two systems, means-tested benefits and
social insurance, both grew significantly over time to encompass both many
more programs and higher overall expenditures.
A. Tax Policy and the Submerged State
Although means-tested benefits and social insurance are the most
visible forms of cash and near-cash assistance, the United States also
dispenses significant financial assistance to individuals and families through
other means. These benefits have been described by Suzanne Mettler as

these overlaps and imperfections, the three categories do serve to describe the overall
nature and trends within the publicly provided U.S. social welfare state, in particular
in the inclusion of previously excluded submerged state benefits. Notice too that this
analysis is limited to programs funded directly by the state. Other analysts
reasonably suggest that this limitation significantly undercounts American social
provision. For example, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the U.S. social welfare state includes not only all these
publicly provided benefit systems but also private social welfare provision in the
form, primarily, of health and retirement benefits. See infra notes 66–82 and
accompanying text.
18. For seminal work on the history of American welfare policy in the
period before welfare reform in the 1990s, see, for example, LINDA GORDON, PITIED
BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890–1935
(1994); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986) [hereinafter KATZ, SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE];
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE (2001) [hereinafter KATZ, PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP].
19. See, e.g., KATZ, SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 18.
20. GORDON, supra note 18, at 253–54; KATZ, PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 18, at 4–5.
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benefits within the “Submerged State.”21 Mettler contrasts visible benefits,
which include both social insurance and means-tested benefits, with other
significant benefits that are structured to be significantly less visible. 22
According to Mettler, “[t]he ‘submerged state’ includes a conglomeration of
federal policies that function by providing incentives, subsidies, or payment
to private organizations or households to encourage or reimburse them for
conducting activities deemed to serve a public purpose.”23
Chief among the programs of the submerged state, and central to the
analysis of social welfare provision in this article, are tax provisions that
simultaneously reduce tax collection and meet social welfare objectives.
Often referred to as tax expenditures, these provisions are tax rules that are
similar in nature to social welfare spending programs in that they provide a
financial benefit and are designed to “promote some socially desirable
objective.”24
21. METTLER, supra note 2, at 4.
22. See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery
of Welfare Benefits, 40 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 253, 272 (2009)(“. . . placing general
welfare (child tax credits, home mortgage deductions, and education credits) within
the tax system frames them so positively that they all but disappear from
consciousness.”).
23. Id.
24. CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS:
DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 16 (2007). Tax expenditures are
defined not only by their social welfare objectives but by the fact that they “depart
from the normal tax system.” Id. More technically, the Joint Committee on Taxation,
which produces an annual report on federal tax expenditures for the House
Committee on Way and Means and the Senate Committee, defines tax expenditures
as “Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption or deduction from
gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax or a deferral
of tax liability.” STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., JCX-97-14,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018 2 (Joint
Comm. Print 2014). According to Nancy Knauer, “[a]s a theoretical construct, tax
expenditure analysis is now widely accepted, although commentators have
continuously questioned the appropriate way to distinguish tax expenditures from the
more structural components of the income tax.” Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax
Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 206, 216–17 (2014)
(citations omitted). Despite the broad acceptance and adoption of the concept of tax
expenditures through federal law and the widespread use of the concept by
organizations like the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Committee on
Taxation, and the Tax Policy Center, there continue to be significant questions about
what tax provisions to include. These questions are complicated but generally center
around what to define as the “normal tax system” and what constitutes a “departure.”
Nevertheless, as explained by scholars associated with the Tax Policy Center, “there
are numerous provisions in the tax code that represent disguised spending under any
reasonable definition and would not be part of any broadly based, normative tax
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The idea that certain tax provisions (known colloquially as tax
breaks) are better understood as a veiled form of social spending is
traditionally attributed in the legal literature to Stanley Surrey, who in 1970
published an article in the Harvard Law Review entitled Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures.25 In that article Surrey demonstrated that the tax
code at the time was replete with “income tax incentives” designed to
“achieve various social and economic objectives . . . similar in nature to
those served by direct governmental expenditures or loan programs.”26 In the
wake of Surrey’s work, in 1974 Congress adopted provisions to account
annually for these expenditures. As explained by Nancy J. Knauer,
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 adopted Surrey's tax expenditure concept and required
the creation of a tax expenditure budget to accompany the
regular direct-spending budget. Organized by budget
function, the tax expenditure budget is designed to both give
policymakers important distributional information, as well as
to make them more accountable for the indirect spending
that they authorize through the tax code.27
Although Surreys’ original work focused on making evident the
existence of and questioning the appropriateness of using tax law tools to
accomplish social welfare objectives, since that time scholars in other fields
have increasingly focused on the political and distributive effects of these tax
provisions and their effect on social welfare provision overall.28 For example,
system.” ERIC J. TODER, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & KATHERINE LIM, DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS
OF
TAX
EXPENDITURES 3 (2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/p
ublication-pdfs/411922-Distributional-Effects-of-Tax-Expenditures.PDF. This paper
relies on analysis from the Congressional Budget Office, the Tax Policy Center, and
the Joint Committee on Taxation for discussion of what constitutes a tax
expenditure, the value of particular tax expenditures and the distributional impact of
those provisions.
25. 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives].
Surrey also published other works on this topic including STANLEY SURREY,
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973). For a
discussion of the origin of the concept of tax expenditures before Surrey, see
HOWARD, supra note 1, at 5–6.
26. Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 25, at 705–06.
27. Knauer, supra note 24, at 216–17.
28. Despite the lack of focus in Surrey’s work on distributive impact, he
did in fact note these effects. For example in listing what he termed “asserted defects
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in The Hidden Welfare State, Christopher Howard sought to bring public
attention to these “hidden” benefits and their differences from more
traditional forms of social welfare provision. In distinguishing his work from
the work of tax scholars Howard argued that,
[those] authors discuss tax expenditures in the context of tax
policy and budgetary reform, not social policy. They are
interested in the way in which tax expenditures affect
decisions about raising revenue and appropriating funds.
They are not interested in investigating how tax expenditures
change our understanding of the American social welfare
state. . . [and] they seldom explore the politics of individual
tax expenditures.29
Howard’s work turned to these questions and demonstrated several
effects of including tax expenditures on the overall nature of the U.S. social
welfare state. For the purposes of this paper, two of his conclusions are
crucial. First, “[p]erhaps the most striking finding is how much larger the
entire American welfare state looks after including tax expenditures. The
hidden welfare state is almost half the size of the visible welfare state . . . .”30
Second, “once tax expenditures are included . . . the notion that benefits flow
mainly to the poor becomes . . . [hard] . . . to sustain.”31 This paper joins and
builds upon Howard’s work in conceptualizing and evaluating these tax tools
not in the frame of tax policy or theory but as a part of the overall U.S. social
welfare system.
Turning to the provisions themselves, prime examples include the
exemption of employer-provided health insurance from taxable income and
the home mortgage interest deduction (HMID). Although in popular
discourse these tax provisions are not viewed as social support because they
simply allow people to keep “their own money,” at least since Surrey’s work,
the federal government and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
of tax incentives” Surrey noted that “tax incentives are inequitable: They are worth
more to the high income taxpayer than the low income taxpayer, [and] they do not
benefit those who are outside the tax system because their incomes are too low . . . or
they are exempt from tax.” Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 25, at 719.
29. HOWARD, supra note 1, at 7. Howard was writing in 1996. Since that
time, several tax law scholars have turned more directly to these social welfare
issues. See, e.g., Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV.
791 (2014); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 978 (2004); KORNHAUSER supra note 22 at
261-64.
30. HOWARD, supra note 1, at 17.
31. Id.
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Development (OECD) have acknowledged that these are in fact a form of
spending. As Howard explains:
[W]ith tax expenditures, the government is essentially
collecting what taxpayers would owe under a “pure” tax
system and simultaneously cutting some taxpayers a check
for behaving in certain desired ways, such as buying a home.
In a pure system, everyone with the same income would pay
the same amount of income tax. In the real world, people
with the same income often do not pay the same tax, because
some are able to take advantage of tax expenditures while
others are not.32
For an example of how this works, take the HMID. Picture two
families who have the same work income coming in, live in identical houses
of identical values and whose tax returns, investments and finances are
identical but for one difference: Family A owns their house outright and
Family B has a mortgage on which they pay interest every month. In a “pure”
tax system the tax bills of the two families would be identical–that is, X
percent of their identical incomes. With the HMID, however, Family B gets
to deduct their mortgage interest from their income before the tax is
assessed.33 So at the end of the day, despite their identical incomes, identical
finances, identically-valued homes, and identical tax brackets, the family
paying mortgage interest pays a lower tax bill because less of that family’s
income is subject to taxation. From a budgetary perspective, the tax the
government does not collect is an expenditure no different than Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a public housing subsidy or a Social
Security check.34
These tax provisions also clearly mirror other spending programs in
their intended effect. As explained by the Congressional Budget Office,
“[b]oth tax expenditures and spending programs provide financial assistance
for particular activities, entities, or groups of people. Through that assistance,
tax expenditures and spending programs alter people’s behavior, change the
allocation of resources in the economy, and transfer income among
32. Id.
33. For this example to work, one would also have to assume that it is
financially beneficial for Family B to itemize deductions rather than claim the
standard deduction.
34. The mere fact that the tax bills of these two hypothetical families are
different is not, in and of itself, what makes the HMID a tax expenditure. For more
detail on the technical definition of a tax expenditure, see supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
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households.” 35 One might, of course, argue that tax expenditures differ
significantly from programs like TANF in important ways that make them
“not welfare.” In popular discourse, this argument generally centers around
the negative connotations associated with the term welfare and boils down to
an assertion that the deduction has merit because it promotes home
ownership while the TANF payment lacks merit because it encourages
dependency. At base, however, statements like these are nothing more than
value judgments about what we consider to be good (home ownership) and
bad (handouts).36 One could just as easily argue that the HMID is bad in that
its primary function is to artificially inflate housing prices and encourage
people to buy houses they cannot actually afford and thus overinvest in real
estate to the detriment of investing in ways that would potentially yield
greater social benefits.37 One could argue that the TANF payment is good in
that it promotes human flourishing and incentivizes employers to pay a living
wage.38
35. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 8 (2013).
36. Despite the fact that it is clear that, as a matter of budgetary cost, tax
expenditures and spending programs are functionally identical, there is no question
that they read politically quite differently. Interestingly, studies consistently
demonstrate far more public support for programs when they are characterized as a
tax break rather than a spending program. For a detailed and interesting discussion of
these studies, see Tahk, supra note 29, at 823, noting that “[t]he second key factor
that advantages the tax war on poverty over the nontax war on poverty is that public
opinion views tax-embedded programs more favorably than their nontax
counterparts. Several recent studies have documented that voters are more likely to
favor a social policy enacted through the tax code than a social policy that is not.”
37. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35, at 7 (“[T]ax
expenditures may lead to an inefficient allocation of economic resources by
encouraging more consumption of goods and services receiving preferential
treatment . . . [f]or example . . . investing too much in housing and too little
elsewhere relative to what they would do if all investments were treated equally.”).
38. One could also argue, more credibly and less politically, that tax
expenditures like the HMID are not cash benefits analogous to Section 8 or TANF
because it is not entirely clear that the taxpayer who claims the deduction, credit,
deferral, or exclusion is the financial beneficiary of the tax provision. For example,
one could argue that the individual who benefits from the HMID is actually the
home seller, who can raise the sale price of the home because the buyer has more to
spend on the house as a result of the HMID. Similarly, one could argue that the
elimination of the HMID would ultimately deflate housing prices, thus netting out
the benefit to buyer or seller. While these arguments are certainly true, similar
complexities apply to poverty-based support. For example, a Section 8 subsidy,
while benefitting the tenant in the sense that the tenant can more easily rent a
particular rental unit and in the sense that it is given in the name of the tenant, the
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The history of these tax provisions also departs from the New Deal
based narrative of U.S. social welfare history. Unlike means-tested benefits
and social insurance, tax expenditures and many other submerged state
benefits find their statutory origins both before and after those programs. For
example the deductions for charitable contributions, home mortgage interest,
employer pensions, and state and local property taxes all date to the 1910s
and 1920s.39 These programs grew slowly and fairly invisibly over the next
few decades. As Mettler describes, with the backlash against the visible
forms of social spending in the later decades of the twentieth century,
submerged state benefits increasingly became the policy tool of choice.40
Submerged state benefits are particularly popular among politically
conservative politicians because “they enable them to deliver goods and
services to core constituencies while neither creating vast new spending
programs nor enlarging the federal bureaucracy . . . .”41 Tax expenditures
have in fact become a very significant portion of federal spending. As
Christopher Faricy describes, “tax expenditures averaged 9 percent of total
U.S spending in the 1980s, 14.6% in the 1990s, and increased to 27% in the
2000s.”42
B. The Size and Impact of Social Welfare Provision
Perceptions about and characterizations of the extent of public U.S.
subsidy is actually paid to the owner of the rental property. Not only does the owner
receive the cash benefit, but the existence of Section 8 certainly affects the rental
value of the property. Elimination of the benefit could, as in the case of the HMID,
deflate or inflate property values depending on local market conditions. Similarly,
benefits like Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps),
although clearly benefitting the direct recipient, also benefits both food producers
and sellers. They also arguably benefit low wage employers, who are able to set
wages lower as a result of the ability of benefit holders to live with and accept lower
wages because part of their food costs are met through SNAP. Because of the
complexity and largely unknown nature of these effects, this paper does not include
these arguments in its analysis instead naming the benefit as a cash provision to the
taxpayer or named benefit recipient and largely (although not entirely) assuming the
face value of the particular program as a measure of the value. Throughout the paper,
sources are provided to provide background on assumptions and calculations.
39. METTLER, supra note 2, at 16–17. For an in-depth discussion of the
origins and development of the HMID as well as of employer pensions, the EITC,
and the targeted jobs tax credit, see HOWARD, supra note 1, at 43–174.
40. METTLER, supra note 2, at 17.
41. Id. For an interesting and in depth study of the use of tax expenditures
by Democrats and Republicans and their effect on income inequality, see FARICY,
supra note 3.
42. Id. at 106.
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social welfare spending tend to depend strongly on one’s political
persuasion. On the right, spending is represented as extensive, unjustified,
and unsustainable. For example, in April 2012 Robert Rector testified
before Congress on behalf of the Heritage Foundation. Rector highlighted
what the foundation estimated to be $927 billion in annual spending on
means-tested benefits at that time.43 Those on the left highlight different
statistics and facts. They note the meager percentage of gross domestic
product spent on social welfare in the United States as compared to other
nations, the high levels of income inequality compared to other nations, and
the very high percentage of individuals who live in poverty in the United
States.44
Generally speaking, neither analysis is wrong, although they clearly
differ both in the moral and democratic values they espouse as well as the
facts they emphasize. What each does, however, is leave out crucial facts.
Even if we are limiting the analysis to public social welfare spending,45 the
lack of completeness rests, at least in part, on the failure to include social
welfare spending through the tax code and other forms of less visible state

43. Strengthening the Safety Net: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Budget, 112th Cong. 26–36 (2012) (statement of Robert Rector, Senior Research
Fellow, The Heritage Foundation) [hereinafter Rector Hearing Statement].
44. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative
Liberty and Laissez Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
25, 38 (2014) (“[W]elfare programs in the United States provide only minimal and
grudging resources for family life. Indeed, the “welfare state” is nearly a misnomer
here: although the term provides a convenient shorthand for a gaggle of federal and
state programs, it is too grandiose to describe the minimal and patchwork protections
enacted by the United States.”).
45. One gets a very different picture of these international comparisons if
one includes not only tax expenditures, as are included here, but also private
spending for social welfare ends. For an interesting example of this type of analysis,
see Kimberly L. Morgan, America’s Misguided Approach to Social Welfare: How
the Country Could Get More for Less, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 3, 2012),
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-12-03/americas-misguidedapproach-social-welfare (explaining that, as calculated by the OECD, “[n]et social
expenditure also includes private spending, whether mandated by the government
(such as requirements that employers pay for sick leave) or voluntary (such as
employer-provided pensions in the United States). As the scholars Jacob Hacker and
Jennifer Klein have shown, the United States’ reliance on voluntary private welfare
is unique. Most adults in the United States receive benefits through their workplaces
that include health insurance, pensions, dependent-care tax exclusions, and the like.
This kind of private spending makes up nearly 40 percent of all U.S. social spending,
compared with under 20 percent in the United Kingdom and about eight percent in
France and Sweden.”).
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subsidy within these accountings. 46 What becomes eminently clear,
however, is that although spending is high, benefit programs embedded
within the tax code often distribute funds upward, boosting income
inequality and doing nothing to address poverty.47
Below is a rough estimate of public, federal expenditures in each of
the three social welfare categories described above. Before proceeding to
the figures though, it is important to be clear about what programs are being
included in this analysis. In general, across each of these categories, this
analysis includes federal programs that provide either cash, near-cash, or
significant non-cash but direct support to individuals or families. So for
means-tested benefits I include all significant spending programs that
provide direct assistance for income support, food, housing, health, and
childcare. For social insurance I include Social Security, Medicare, and
Social Security Disability, and for tax expenditures I include the ten largest
tax expenditures claimed on personal (as opposed to corporate) returns, all
of which function as cash transfers to the households that receive them.
There is no question that one could quibble about what programs to include
or not.48 But despite these potential disagreements, the basic points outlined
here about size and distribution remain true.
As to spending on the majority mean-tested cash and near-cash
benefits, in 2014 the U.S. government spent approximately $529 billion on
the largest cash and near-cash benefit programs for housing, food, cash
assistance, medical care, and childcare.49 For social insurance the United
46. For an in-depth look at these misperceptions and their origins, see
HOWARD, supra note 24, for a prime example of how these accountings tend to be
presented. Again, it is important to note that, by providing this information, this
article does not seek to support an argument that the United States should spend less
on social support. To the contrary, there are tremendously good reasons to suggest
that it is a primary responsibility to use the power of the state to ensure that the basic
needs of its citizens are met. What this article does support, however, are calls to
surface and to address the distribution and structural inequalities across class
embedded in our social welfare programs.
47. See infra Part III.B.3–4.
48. For example, analysts at the OECD exclude the HMID from their
category of “Tax Breaks for a Social Purpose” because it fails to meet their
definition of a program for social welfare ends. See infra notes 73–75 and
accompanying text. Scholars and analysts focused on American tax policy more
specifically, however include that particular program. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 35, at 1 (2013); ERIC TODER & DANIEL BANEMAN,
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES: AN UPDATE,
TAX POLICY CENTER 17–18 (2012).
49. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES
OF
THE
U.S.
GOVERNMENT,
at
tbl.25-12
(2015),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2016-PER-9-6-
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States spent approximately $1.39 trillion ($545 billion on Medicare and $845
billion on Old Age and Disability Insurance).50 Finally in 2013,51 the United
States provided more than $900 billion to individuals and families through
2.pdf (table for “Baseline Net Budget Authority By Function, Category, and
Program”) [hereinafter Table 25-12]. This figure includes 2014 outlays (all in
billions) for Medicaid ($301,472); the Children’s Health Insurance Program
($9,314); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance ($76,230); the Supplemental Food
Program for Women, Infants and Children ($6,265); state child nutrition programs
($19,481), federally funded housing programs ($43,020); Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families ($16,887) Supplemental Security Income ($54,012), the Childcare
and Development Block Grant ($2,226). Id. Not included in this number are transfer
programs focusing on education and training, energy assistance, Veteran’s benefits,
programs funded to provide services to low income individuals and communities,
and some smaller mean-tested programs. Also excluded, to prevent double counting,
are means-tested tax expenditures, the two most significant of which are the EITC
($60,087) and the CTC ($21,490). These two benefits are excluded here but included
in the figures detailing the value of income transfers through tax expenditures. These
figures differ from those offered by Robert Rector for several reasons. Rector
Hearing Statement, supra note 43. In addition to relying on 2011 instead of 2014
data, the most significant difference between that accounting and the one included in
this paper is the inclusion of state funds. Under Rector’s analysis the total federal
expenditures are $717.1 billion rather than $927 billion. Id. at 35. In addition
Rector’s accounting included many services, as opposed to cash or cash-equivalent,
programs. For example Rector includes funding for social services, job training,
community economic development and certain education programs and I did not. Id.
at 27, 31.
50. Table 25-12, supra note 49.
51. For this calculation, despite the obvious downside of using 2013
rather than 2014 data, I have chosen to use these figures because of complications
involved in calculating the value of tax expenditures. While one can calculate
outlays for direct spending programs simply by adding budget items, the calculation
of tax expenditures is far more complicated. This is due to a variety of important
factors. First, although one can calculate the revenue lost through a particular tax
provision, this figure only represents the revenue that the state would gain if the
particular provision was repealed and there were no other effects. It therefore does
not account for behavioral and market changes that might result. So for example it
does not contemplate the housing market effects on a repeal of the HMID, although
presumably its repeal would potentially lower market prices and/or lower the amount
that a particular family spends on a home. In addition, as explained by the
Congressional Budget Office, “the estimated magnitude of a collection of tax
expenditures may differ from the sum of the estimate magnitudes of the separate
expenditures because of the interactions that arise among expenditures.” CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35, at 9. Finally, estimations “are measured relative to a
comprehensive income tax system. If tax expenditures were evaluated relative to an
alternative tax system . . . some of the 10 major tax expenditures [included in the
CBO report] would not be considered tax expenditures.” Id.
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the ten largest tax expenditures.52 This figure included approximately two
thirds of spending through tax expenditures and totaled approximately 5.7%
of gross domestic product.53 Clearly, inclusion of tax expenditures in the
category of social welfare spending significantly affects the size of the U.S.
social welfare state.54
Although all three categories are fairly considered social welfare
programs, they benefit very different groups in society. The majority of
means-tested benefits go to those in poverty; social insurance goes to nearly
all with distribution being overall progressive, distributing more to those on
the lower end of the income spectrum.55 In contrast tax expenditures flow
primarily to those in the top quintiles of the economic distribution.
1. Means Tested Benefits for Households in Poverty.
As to means-tested benefits, clearly these benefits flow to those of
very limited economic means. In general these programs have an income cap
that limits eligibility to those at or below the cap, and some but not all
programs also bar receipt of benefits based on the financial resources
(savings, homes, cars) of the applicant. Income caps are, in general, pegged
to benefit levels, to some percentage of the poverty line (e.g., 100% or 130%
of poverty), or to some percentage of the area median income. So for
example eligibility for TANF is defined by the state. In a state like
Tennessee this means that a family of four is not eligible for cash assistance
if their gross monthly income is over $2,240. 56 Supplemental Nutrition
52. Id. at 1. The ten tax expenditures included in this analysis were
exclusions for employer-sponsored health insurance, net pension contributions and
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, and a portion of Social Security
and railroad retirement benefits; deductions including some taxes paid to state and
local governments, mortgage interest payment and charitable contributions; and two
tax credits, the EITC and the childcare tax credit. Id. In thinking about the value of
tax expenditures it is important to note the difficulties in these calculations.
53. Id. For another view of the relative size of tax expenditures consider
that, according to Nancy J. Knauer, “in 2011, the total amount of the personal
income tax expenditures exceeded the defense budget.” Knauer, supra note 24, at
216–17 (citations omitted).
54. Although it is not the focus of this article, there is no question that
inclusion of tax expenditures, as well as the inclusion of the impact of both taxation
of some benefits and taxation of consumer goods, also significantly impacts the
generally held perception that U.S. social welfare spending lags behind spending
elsewhere. Although it is still true that, overall, spending does lag behind, the
differentials are not quite as drastic as commonly perceived. For an in-depth analysis
of these issues, see HOWARD, supra note 24, at 13–26.
55. See infra Part II.B.2.
56. Tennessee Families First, BENEFITS.GOV,
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Assistance (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps) is an example of a major program
tied closely to the poverty level. To be eligible for SNAP a family cannot
have gross income exceeding 130% of poverty. So for a family of four their
gross monthly income cannot exceed $2,663 per month.57 Eligibility for the
major public housing programs is determined a little differently. Depending
on the program, a household might be eligible for assistance if household
income is less than 80% or 50% of your area’s median income (AMI),
although in several of these programs in effect few units or subsidies flow to
those above 50% of AMI. 58 To give some sense of numbers again, in
Tennessee in 2015 for a family of four 50% of AMI is $28,050 in annual
income.59 Without belaboring the point, it is clear that these benefits flow to
those of extremely limited means.60
2. Social Insurance for Retirees and Some Disabled Individuals
As detailed above, the two primary social insurance benefits are Old
Age Insurance and Medicare.61 Unlike the two other categories of benefits, in
terms of class distribution, Social Security and Medicare are closer to
universal benefits 62 for individuals who are categorically eligible, in the
sense that they are received by a far larger part of the population. For
https://www.benefits.gov/benefits/benefit-details/1678 (last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
57. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Eligibility, USDA FOOD
AND NUTRITION SERVICE, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility (last visited
Mar. 9, 2017).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(1-2) (2017); 24 C.F.R. § 5.603 (2017).
59. FY 2015 State Income Limits, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/il/il15/State_Incomelimits_Report.pdf
(last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
60. Table F-1. Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of
Families, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, h https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-families.html (last visited Ap. 22,
2017).
61. In addition, the U.S. Social Security Administration provides
assistance to the spouses and children of retirees as well as to disabled individuals
with a significant work history. See Frequently Asked Questions: Spouses, Children,
Survivors, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Artic
leFolder/419/Spouses-Children-Survivors (last visited Apr. 22, 2017); Frequently
Asked Questions: Disability, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/
34011/34019/ArticleFolder/417/Disability (last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
62. As a general matter, because the two programs are programmatically
linked, recipients of Social Security also receive Medicare. Understanding
Supplemental Security Income SSI and Other Government Programs—2016 Edition,
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2017).
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example, according to the Social Security Administration just shy of nine out
of ten Americans over 65 receive a Social Security payment.63 This does not,
however, mean that benefits are evenly distributed across class. In fact,
overall, social insurance benefits are distributed progressively, with lower
income families receiving more than they put into the system while higher
income families receive less than they put in.64
3. Tax Expenditures for the Top
While a small percentage of the provisions that the Congressional
Budget Office deems tax expenditures benefit those in lower income
quintiles, the vast majority benefit the richest—those in the top 20% and 5%
of earners. For the ten largest tax expenditures in 2013, which again totaled
over $900 billion or 5.6% of GDP, “more than half of the combined benefits
. . . accrue to households in the highest income quintile . . . with 17% going
to households in the top 1 percent of the population.”65
The implication of these facts bear repeating. Quite simply, many tax
provisions constitute public benefits programs, the total size of which
exceeds the value of all means-tested cash and cash-equivalent benefits.
These programs benefit disproportionately the very wealthy in the United
States. So it is profoundly misleading to say that the United States has a
meager social welfare state. Instead, it is quite large. What it is not, however,
is one that is targeted primarily to benefit those in poverty or even those on
the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Instead vast portions of the U.S.
social welfare state benefit those in the middle and those at the top.
C. The Distribution of Social Welfare Benefits and the Effect on Income
Inequality
Although one can parse the question of distributive impact of U.S.
social welfare provision in a variety of ways, one of the most persuasive and
comprehensive analyses comes from the OECD. In an effort to provide
meaningful cross-country comparison of social welfare spending, researchers
at the OECD developed the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). This
database stores data on social expenditures across multiple categories for
63. Fact Sheet, Social Security,
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/basicfact-alt.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2017).
64. FARICY, supra note 3, at 185 (“Kelly [] found that Social Security
alone reduces income inequality by 6.9% and Medicare, by itself, reduced income
inequality by 3.6%.”) (citing NATHAN J. KELLY, THE POLITICS OF INCOME
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2009)).
65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35, at 1.
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OECD countries.66
Relying on SOCX data, Adema, Fron, and Ladique sought to
determine social welfare spending across the OECD as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP). They then analyzed the comparative effect on
income inequality of that spending.67 In terms of spending as a percentage of
GDP, the paper includes three categories of spending: public expenditures,
taxation effects, and private expenditures for social welfare ends. Focusing
on the first category, public expenditures include public spending in nine
social welfare categories: old age, survivors, health, family, active labor
market programs, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas.68
For the United States these categories include a wide variety of what this
paper terms cash and near cash benefits as well as spending on other
programs serving social welfare ends.69
In the second category are Tax Breaks with a Social Purpose (TBSP)
and other tax effects. Although other tax effects such as taxation of benefits
and indirect taxation on consumption can have a significant effect on social
welfare spending in other countries, those effects are less significant in the
United States.70 In contrast, in the United States TBSPs play a large role in
comparison to other OECD countries. 71 TBSPs are defined as “those
reductions, exemptions, deductions or postponements of taxes, which: (a)
perform the same policy function as transfer payments which, if they existed,
would be classified as social expenditures; or (b) are aimed at stimulating
66. Social Expenditures Database, OECD.ORG,
www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
67. Willem Adema, Pauline Fron & Maxime Ladaique, How Much Do
OECD Countries Spend on Social Protection and How Redistributive are Their
Tax/Benefit Systems?, 67 INT'L SOC. SECURITY REV. 10 (2014).
68. OECD SOCIAL EXPENDITURE DATABASE (SOCX), SOCIAL
EXPENDITURE UPDATE: SOCIAL SPENDING IS FALLING IN SOME COUNTRIES, BUT IN
MANY OTHERS IT REMAINS AT HISTORICALLY HIGH LEVELS 2 (2014). See also Adema,
W., P. Fron & M. Ladaique, Is the European Welfare State Really More Expensive?:
Indicators on Social Spending, 1980-2012; and a Manual to the OECD Social
Expenditure Database (SOCX), (OECD Soc., Emp’t & Migration Working Papers,
No. 124, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg2d2d4pbf0-en. Note that these
categories are much broader than the cash and cash-equivalent benefits focused on in
this paper.
69. For example, in contrast to the calculations above, the SOCX includes
U.S. expenditures on child welfare administration and training within the category of
family benefits. For a detailed discussion of the programs included in these
categories, see Country Note: Database on Social Expenditures: United States,
OECD SOC. POL’Y DIV., http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG
(last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
70. Adema, et al., supra note 67, at 9.
71. Id. at 11.
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private provision of benefits . . . .” 72 Although the definitions of tax
expenditures and TBSPs do vary, 73 with one exception, 74 the tax
expenditures discussed in this paper also fall within the TBSP category.75
As suggested above, TBSPs have a significant effect on the overall
size of U.S. social welfare spending. One can see this most clearly when
looking at social welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. While in 2009
U.S. gross public expenditures on social welfare ends amounted to 19.1% of
GDP, when taking into account tax effects, and most importantly TBSPs,
that figure rose to 20.3% of GDP, or slightly higher than the average
spending for the OECD 29.76
72. Id.
73. While, as described above, a tax expenditure is defined at its core as a
departure from the normal tax system, TBSPs do not reference nor are they defined
in relationship to any conception of a normal tax base. Instead, they are defined by
their structure (a reduction, exemption, deduction or deferral) and their social
purpose.
74. Researchers at the OECD chose not to include the U.S. HMID in the
category of TBSP for housing. Id. at 92. The reason for this decision, according to
Willem Adema, is
[i]t was decided to consider rent subsidies as social, as well as
residential support for the elderly, disabled and other population
groups (as recorded under Old-age, Incapacity-related benefits, etc. .
. .). Mortgage relief for low-income households has some similarities
with such programs, but it is unclear up to what level of income, or
what level of property value, such support should be considered
social (and possible thresholds will differ across countries). For these
reasons, mortgage relief and capital subsidies towards construction of
housing are not considered in SOCX.
Email from Willem Adema to author (June 3, 2016) (on file with author). While the
OECD made the choice to exclude the HMID, other researchers and policy analysts,
and particularly those focused on U.S. policy, include it. See supra note 48.
75. The OECD SOCX also includes and tabulates private spending on
social welfare ends. For example, in the United States it would include private
spending on health insurance (and not just the TBSP that support such spending) as
social welfare spending. For more information on this analysis and its significance,
see supra note 45. Full analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
76. Adema, et al., supra note 67, at 15. Note that the estimate of TBSPs as
a percentage of GDP here (just over 2%) varies from the estimate provided supra by
the Congressional Budget Office (5.4%). Cf. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35,
at 4. This results from the inclusion, by Adema, Fron and Ladaique, in this particular
analysis, of only one of three categories of TBSPs. The researchers include TBSPs
similar to cash benefits but exclude TBSPs that stimulate the use of private social
benefits as well as tax breaks for pensions, which the SOCX estimates only very
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This increase in spending, however, does not mean an increase in
addressing either poverty or economic inequality. Because TBSPs tend to
benefit the wealthy far more than the poor, the overall effect of social
spending on income inequality if far less significant than in the same OECD
countries. Adema, Fron and Ladique rely on SOCX data to demonstrate the
overall effect of social welfare policy on inequality. This analysis takes into
consideration “the overall level of the tax burden, the degree of progressivity
in tax systems, the degree of targeting within social programmes, and the
level of social expenditure”77 in the nations they analyze. In the United States
public benefits represent 12.6% of net household income; only 21.9% of
those transfers go to the lowest quintile resulting in 2.8% of gross benefits
accruing to the bottom quintile. 78 Further, when taking into account public
social welfare benefit and TBSPs as well as other tax effects, these programs
have a less redistributive effect (24%) in the United States than they do in the
OECD overall (35%).79
In the end, taking into consideration the broadest range of programs,
including publicly supported private provision and taking into consideration
the net impact of progressive taxation rates, the overall U.S. social welfare
provision remain progressive, but due to the use of TBSPs, which benefit the
wealthy more than the poor, the system overall is less progressive than in
other OECD countries. These economic analyses do not, however, focus on
the striking differences in the means of administration of benefit provision
across class. It is to this topic that Part III turns.

III. A DMINISTRATIVE I NEQUALITIES : F ROM
H YPERREGULATION TO E NTITLEMENTS
As detailed above, the United States provides extensive support to
individuals across the income spectrum. This Part turns to five different
programs that vary significantly in the class quintiles they benefit and argues
that the means of administration varies significantly, moving from highly
stigmatizing, hyperregulatory structures at the bottom to programs that are
the functional equivalent of nearly invisible entitlements at the top. Given the
social welfare ends that all these programs purport to serve, Part IV argues
that these structural inequalities are tremendously difficult to justify and that
these administrative inequalities must be a focus for reform.
generally due to difficulties in calculation. Adema, et al., supra note 67, at 11–13.
The exclusion of those categories, in particular the support for pensions and
employer provided health insurance significantly lower the overall percentage of
TBSPs in these calculations.
77. Adema, et al., supra note 67, at 16.
78. Id. at 18 tbl.2.
79. Id.
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A. Providing Benefits Across Class: Focusing on Housing and Income
Support
As one moves from the bottom to the top of the income scale the
administrative structures shift from what I have previously described as
hyperregulatory to structures that function remarkably similarly to
entitlements, from an administrative, budgetary, and statutory perspective.
On the top and bottom of the income scale are two sets of benefits that
provide support for housing. At the top are the HMID and real estate tax
deduction, two tax expenditures that provide more than twice the housing
support given to the poor and go disproportionately to those in the top
quintiles of the income distribution. In sharp contrast, at the bottom of the
scale are public housing and TANF benefits that go to those at the very
bottom and that, from an administrative perspective, could not be more
different than the housing benefits for the rich. In the middle are two other
tax expenditures, the EITC, which benefits those in the first and second
quintiles, and the CTC, which benefits those in the broad middle of the
income spectrum. To lay the framework for these arguments, this Part begins
with a description of the five benefit programs at issue. It then proceeds, in
subsection B, to a discussion of the contrasts in regulatory structures.
1. Housing Benefits: A Study in Distributive and Size Contrasts
Although arguably many economic supports (defined broadly)
provide additional income to individuals and families, thereby indirectly
supporting the ability of families to secure housing, specific benefits are
targeted particularly at enabling individuals or families to own or rent their
homes. Included in this range are both income supports for various groups
and extensive tax subsidies for property owners.
The federal government provides direct housing assistance to those
in poverty through a number of programs. The three largest are the Housing
Choice Voucher program (commonly referred to as Section 8), Public
Housing, and Project-Based Section 8. Together they supply over 90% of
federally subsidized housing units to those below, at, or slightly above the
poverty line.80
As noted above, the federal government also provides substantial
assistance for housing through the tax system. There are two principal tax
provisions that subsidize housing directly. First, homeowners who pay
interest on their mortgages are able to deduct those expenses from their
taxable income through the HMID. Second, homeowners who pay state and
80. Fact Sheet: Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-13-11hous-US.pdf.
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local property tax are also able to deduct that expense. The effect is to
significantly lower the effective tax rate for those households.81
While it is clear that the federal government spends significant sums
on housing, what is perhaps surprising is the comparative size of these
programs. For FY 2015 the HMID cost approximately $74 billion and the
state and local property tax deduction cost $34 billion, 82 for a total of $108
billion in tax expenditures for housing. In contrast, in 2015, together the
Housing Choice Voucher Program, Public Housing, and Project-Based
Section 8 cost a total of approximately $43 billion.83 So the bottom line is
that spending for housing related tax provisions outstrips spending for
poverty-focused housing support by well over 100%.
2. Income Support for Households with Dependents: Distribution to
the Bottom, the Middle and the Upper Middle Class.
As is the case for housing support, the United States provides
significant support, in the form of direct cash transfers, to households with
dependent children. The three primary federal programs providing this
support are TANF, the EITC,84 and the CTC.
TANF is the federal cash assistance program that arose from the
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).85 TANF provides benefits only to extremely poor households,
those well below the federal poverty level and at the low end of the first
income quintile. While TANF is targeted at very low-income households, the
program’s success at reaching poor households with dependent children has
consistently declined over the last twenty years. This is most clearly
evidenced by what Legal Momentum has termed the TANF Misery Index.86
The index measures the sum of the percentage of households with children
under 18 in poverty served by TANF and the difference between the poverty
81.
82.

See infra Part III.B.3.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 112TH CONG., JCS-1-12,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015, at 32–
46 (Joint Comm. Print 2012) (Table 1).
83. Table 25-12, supra note 49.
84. Technically, the EITC is not exclusively given to households with
dependent children. Households without dependent children can receive a
comparatively small EITC benefit. I.R.C. § 32(b). Nevertheless the program remains
primarily focused on households with dependent children.
85. Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
86. Tim Casey, A TANF Misery Index, LEGAL MOMENTUM: THE
WOMEN’S
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND (Apr. 9, 2013) http://www.legalmomentum.
org/resources/tanf-misery-index.
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level for a family of three and the median state TANF eligibility level for the
same family with no income.87 Their data are telling. In 2012 TANF failed to
serve 74% of households with children under 18 in poverty.88 In addition,
state TANF eligibility cut offs were, on average, 73% below the poverty
level.89 In 2012, the poverty level for a household of three was $19,090 in
annual gross income.90 So to get TANF, on average a household of three
could have only $5,154 in annual income and only 26% of those very poor
households actually received these benefits. These figures contrast
significantly with those in 1996, although those figures too reveal a program
with eligibility levels far below the poverty line. In that year, only 28% of
those in poverty did not receive TANF and TANF income cut-offs were set
at 66% of the poverty line.91
Compared to TANF, which serves a small percentage of the very
poor, the EITC is far larger and serves primarily those in the first two income
quintiles. For tax year 2015, the amount of federal EITC paid was
approximately $67 billion and went primarily to the first and second
quintiles.92 For example, in 2012 51% of EITC benefits went to those in first
quintile and 29% went to those in the second quintile.93 To understand this
distribution, one must understand a little bit about the purpose and structure
of that program. The EITC is a tax credit that can function both to reduce
ultimate tax liability, and in some cases to provide a benefit in excess of the

87. Tim Casey, The TANF Misery Index Climbed to a Record High in
2012, LEGAL MOMENTUM: THE WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND
(Feb.
2014), http://www.legalmomentum.org/resources/tanf-misery-index-2014update. Since the Misery index measures the sum of two percentages it maximum
total is 200. To give an example, the index would be zero in a state in which
eligibility for TANF was set at the poverty level and benefits were provided to all
eligible families. In contrast it would be 200 in a state with no TANF program since
100% of those in poverty would not receive the benefit and the maximum benefit
amount would, by definition be zero, resulting in a 100% difference between the
poverty level and the maximum benefit amount. There is no state that reaches either
one of these extremes. The state with the lowest index in 2012 was Maine (at 106)
and the highest was Mississippi (at 182). Id.
88. Id. at tbl.1.
89. Id.
90. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034,
4035 (2012).
91. Casey, supra note 87, at 2.
92. About EITC, EITC CENTRAL, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITCCentral/abouteitc (last updated Apr. 11, 2017).
93. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35, at 15. In addition 12% of EITC
benefits went to the third quintile, 6% to the fourth and 3% to the highest quintile.
Id.
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tax liability.94 Because low income households with dependent children often
have little to no tax liability, the fact that the EITC provides payments even
when there is no remaining tax liability is crucial, resulting in significant
benefits that would not accrue to poor families were it structured differently.
The EITC is also restricted to households with income from work.95 Thus by
definition it does not provide any benefits to those in poverty who have not
and/or cannot obtain work.
The EITC also phases out to zero gradually as adjusted gross income
rises. For example, in 2017 a single parent household with three or more
dependent children will not receive the EITC if household income exceeds
$48,340 (for a married couple filing jointly with three or more dependent
children the limit is $53,930).96 These maximums are misleading, however,
because households at that income level receive very low benefits. EITC
benefits begin to “phase-out” or reduce when adjusted income reaches far
lower levels. So, for example, for a single parent household with three or
more children, the family will receive the maximum credit (in 2017 $6,318)
when earned income is at least $14,040 and adjusted gross income is less
than $18,340 annually.97 With higher adjusted income, between $18,340 and
$48,340, the amount of the EITC diminishes, or phases out, going to zero
above the cap.98 Thus the EITC provides the most benefits to those lower
income households.
As a matter of overall spending the CTC is smaller than the EITC.
For 2015 the total value of the CTC was $57.3 billion.99 For most families in
receipt of the credit, the CTC provides a credit of $1,000 per child, and,
unlike the EITC,100 there is no maximum number of children for whom
taxpayers can take the credit. While the CTC does play some role in
alleviating poverty, in general it is targeted more strongly at the lower middle
and middle of the income spectrum. For example, for 2013 the Congressional
94. I.R.C. § 32.
95. The relevant statutory provision, I.R.C. § 32, provides the credit for
those with “earned income.” Earned income includes all taxable income and wages
received from working as well as a limited number of disability benefits received
prior to retirement age. What is Earned Income?, INTERNAL REV. SERV. (Dec. 16,
2016)
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-taxcredit/earned-income.
96. I.R.C. § 32; Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.
97. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.
98. Id. For married filing jointly, the phase-out starts at $23,930 and ends
at $23,930. Id.
99. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 24, at 30.
100. The EITC provides the highest benefits to households with three or
more children. There is no additional benefit for households with more than three
children. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1).
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Budget Office estimates that 22% of the credit went to the lowest quintile,
29% went to the second, 26% went to the third, 12% went to the fourth and
only 3% went to the top quintile.101 This distribution is due to a variety of
factors. As an initial matter, the CTC is not available to the poorest
households. Those with less than $3,000 in earned income are ineligible.102
In addition, unlike the EITC, the CTC is only partially refundable and under
a complex formula.103 Its distribution to higher quintiles is also due to the
phase-outs and caps that contrast significantly with those for the EITC. The
CTC program does not begin to phase out until a married couple’s modified
adjusted income reaches $110,000104 per year and does not reach the cap
until the same couple’s modified adjusted income is $130,000, if the couple
has one child.105
In short, these benefit programs (housing-related tax deductions, the
CTC, the EITC, Section 8 and TANF) represent five distinct programs that
span the class spectrum from the very poor to the very wealthy. Having
established this continuum, this Part now turns to the varying mechanisms of
administration that characterize these programs, beginning with the study in
contrasts epitomized by the housing benefits.
B. Examining Benefits Across Class: Moving from Distributive to
Structural Questions.
A central claim of this paper is that social welfare provision
promotes inequality not only, as discussed in Part II, by regressively
distributing significant benefits through the tax code but also, importantly,
through regulatory and administrative structures. The programs manifest
101. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 35, at 15.
102. I.R.C. § 24(d)(1)(B)(i).
103. I.R.C. § 24(d). The formula operates by increasing a taxpayer’s
refundable credits by the lesser of (A) the maximum CTC that would be allowed if
limitations on refundability did not apply (but taking into account the phaseouts for
modified adjusted gross income) or (B) the amount of additional nonrefundable
credits (not taking into account the CTC) that would be allowed if the limitation
generally applicable to nonrefundable credits and tied to regular tax liability were
increased by the greater of (i) “15 percent of so much of the taxpayer's earned
income . . . as exceeds $3,000” or (ii) if the taxpayer has three of more qualifying
children, the excess of the taxpayer’s Social Security taxes minus the taxpayer’s
EITC. Id. Because of the phaseouts tied to income, the partial refundability will be
of greatest benefit to lower and low-middle income households.
104. I.R.C. § 24(b)(2)(A).
105. I.R.C. § 24(b)(1). More technically, the credit is reduced by $50 for
every $1,000 (or fraction thereof) over the threshold, thus with one child ($1000
credit), the phaseout would be complete at $130,000 for married filing jointly status.
Id.
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differences along a variety of axes. For example, there are stark differences
in the means of congressional authorization and refunding; the resources
provided to policing programmatic error; the nature of application processes;
the extent and nature of behavioral controls embedded in the program; and
finally the extent of mandated personal data disclosure and data-sharing
between benefits agencies and more punitive systems and the risks these data
sharing arrangements cause for recipients’ families. As one moves from
benefits at the bottom to benefits at the top, one sees these mechanisms shift
from what I have previously called hyperregulatory to administrative
structures that function nearly invisibly and as entitlements. The example of
housing support provides perhaps the starkest example of these
administrative contrasts.
1. Administrative Mechanisms at the Bottom: Public Housing and the
Housing Choice Voucher Program
As discussed in Part III.A, the federal government funds several
large public housing programs that provide housing to low-income families.
Very briefly, the public housing program provides federally funded and
locally managed housing to families that meet application criteria.106 The
housing choice voucher program, commonly referred to as Section 8,
functions differently. In that program, a voucher is issued to the eligible
recipient and then that tenant uses it to rent private housing.107 The two
largest programs, public housing and the Housing Choice Voucher program,
however, bear striking administrative similarities.108 They were both created
through federal legislation (public housing in 1937 109 and Section 8 in
1974110) and are subject to annual appropriations in the congressional budget
process. In addition, while vital, these programs fail to meet the needs of the
majority of needy households. Each year the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development delivers a “Worst Case Housing Needs” report to
Congress, detailing the number of households annually who are “very lowincome renters who do not receive government housing assistance and who
106. HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB.
DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog
(last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
107. Id.
108. Project-based Section 8 provides another very significant source of
housing for low income households. For ease of analysis this section talks only about
public housing and the Housing Choice Voucher program, but project-based Section
8 manifests similar administrative features.
109. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888.
110. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-383,
88 Stat. 633.
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paid more than one-half of their income for rent, lived in severely inadequate
conditions, or both.” 111 In 2013, 7.72 million households met that
definition.112 HUD attributes the problem in part to the shortage of affordable
housing units. As they explained, “only 65 affordable units are available per
100 very low-income renters, and only 39 units are available per 100
extremely low-income renters.”113
In addition, in both programs, application and recertification
processes are extensive and conducted in person at local housing agencies.
Under federal regulations, local public housing agencies can deny and/or
terminate assistance on a wide variety of grounds. A household can be
denied assistance if, among other grounds, they violate “family obligations,”
if they have been evicted from federally assisted housing the past five years,
for owing rent to another public housing agency114 or for variety of drug and
crime related reasons.115 They must be denied on a variety of drug and
alcohol related bases, including a determination that a household member “is
currently engaging in the illegal use of a drug.” 116 They can lose their
voucher under a similarly broad array of circumstances.117
Families can lose their housing or their voucher not only for their
own conduct but for the conduct of household members and guests. The
ability to evict entire households based on the conduct of its members or
guests, stems from the one-strike policy, put in place under President
Clinton. Under that policy, families residing in public housing can be
evicted upon proof that a member of the household or a guest of that
household has engaged in criminal activity. The full import of the one strike
policy, which allows evictions regardless of the knowledge or control of the
head of household as to the conduct, was solidified in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker.118
Pearlie Rucker, the named plaintiff in the suit, was being evicted under 42
U.S. Code section 1437d(l)(6) which requires that every public housing lease
contain a provision stating, “that any . . . drug-related criminal activity on or
off [public housing] premises, engaged in by a member of the tenant’s
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be
cause for termination of the tenancy.” The facts leading to her eviction
involved an allegation that her mentally disabled daughter was found three
111. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. &
RESEARCH, WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS: 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (2015).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 11.
114. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c) (2017).
115. 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii) (2017).
116. Id.
117. 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(b)(1)(i)(a) (2017).
118. 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
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blocks from Rucker’s apartment with cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe.119
Rucker had no knowledge of these acts nor could she control her daughter’s
conduct.120 Nevertheless the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S. Code section
1437d(l)(6), “unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public
housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related
criminal activity of household member and guests whether or not the tenant
knew, or should have known, about the activity.”121
Not only do these programs collect a tremendous amount of
information about families and possess ample grounds to deny or terminate
assistance, but in a phenomena I have previously described as regulatory
intersectionality, the Section 8 voucher program is characterized by
mechanisms that allow “information that is deemed to indicate noncompliant and/or deviant conduct [to travel] from the original social welfare
system into other even more punitive systems.”122 As is often typical of
means-tested programs,123 the regulatory framework for both public housing
and project-based Section 8 contemplate extensive data-sharing between
those public and private entities administering the support and other more
punitive government agencies. Many of these data-sharing arrangements
arise from the above-described focus on barring families with criminal
histories from receiving subsidies and evicting families whose members are
accused of criminal activity from public housing.
Regulatory intersectionality generally begins with the ability of a
social welfare agency to collect and share data about benefit applicants and
recipients. When one applies for Section 8 or public housing, the applicant
fills out an application and turns it in to the local public housing agency.
Applicants must provide information about income, members of your
household, and immigration status, and “any other information that the
[public housing agency] or HUD determines is necessary in the
administration of the program.”124 HUD regulations make clear that public
housing agencies have free access to criminal justice data. Under 24 Code of
Federal Regulations section 5.903 all public housing applicants must sign a
consent form allowing law enforcement agencies to release and public
housing authorities to use criminal conviction records. Public housing
agencies are authorized “to obtain criminal conviction records from a law
enforcement agency [and may use such records] to screen applicants for
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
supra note 5.
124.

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Bach, supra note 5, at 337.
For additional examples of regulatory intersectionality, see Bach,
24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(1) (2017).
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admission to covered housing programs and for lease enforcement or
eviction of families . . . .”125 In addition to these provisions, applicants can be
asked to allow access to a wide variety of records pertaining to the
household. For example, in Knoxville, Tennessee, as a part of the application
process for public housing and for Section 8, applicants must sign a waiver
allowing the local agency to access:
(a) employment or unemployment records (other than salary
and wage information which is subject to separate
authorization); (b) social security records; (c) Department of
Human Services records; (d) utility records; (e) police and
sheriff’s department records; (f) Veteran’s administration
records; (g) juvenile and circuit court records; (h) homeless
shelter records; (i) child care provider records; (k) social
worker records; (l) parole officer records; (m) drug treatment
center records; (n) records from any landlord and all other
records of any description or nature whatsoever from any
agency or source which related to the undersigned or to any
minor child of the undersigned and which Knoxville’s
Community Development Corporation determines are
necessary to permit it to determine to initial or continuing
eligibility of the undersigned to receive benefits or the grant
or denial of a federal preference under any public housing or
Section 8 housing program or the level of benefits available
to the undersigned under such program.126
In addition to these formal rules, it is clear that there is a substantial
informal overlay ensuring that criminal justice and other data about public
housing tenants is regularly shared with local housing agencies. For example
Kristin Henning, Wendy J. Kaplan and Davis Rossman have unearthed a
good deal of evidence that public housing agencies are receiving and acting
on information concerning purportedly confidential juvenile delinquency
proceedings records.127 In my own jurisdiction, Knoxville, Tennessee, not
125. 24 C.F.R. § 5.903 (2017).
126. Knoxville’s Community Development Corporation, Authorization to
Release
Records
and
Information,
December
2012
(available
at
http://www.kcdc.org/Libraries/Housing_Forms/Moderate_Rehabilitation_Applicatio
n_Form.sflb.ashx) (last visited February 6, 2016).
127. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency
Proceedings: Should School and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 520 (2004); Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called “Out” At Home:
The One Strike Eviction Policy and Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE
109 (2011).
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only does the standard waiver form applicants sign allow the agency to
access juvenile records but an interagency partnership that includes the
Juvenile Court, the local police, local schools and the local housing authority
all regularly share data about certain children who have been adjudicated
delinquent, leading at times to evictions of the families of these children.128
This data sharing is of course taking place in the context of the welldocumented over-policing of poor communities of color.
While Project-Based Section 8 is administered quite differently from
public housing, when it comes to the policing of households and data access,
there are striking similarities. For example 24 Code of Federal Regulations
section 5.903 requires applicants for those programs to sign the same consent
form as a condition of residing in project-based Section 8 building. While
under the regulations property owners cannot receive conviction records
directly from law enforcement agencies, they can request them of their local
public housing agency and, if the information reveals information relevant to
acceptance or termination, the public housing agency can then share the data
with the private owner.129 This set of legal and extra-legal mechanisms are a
clear example of regulatory intersectionality. One story, recently highlighted
by scholar Priscilla Ocen and described in the next section, gives a clear
picture of how data collection, increased scrutiny, and regulatory
intersections are wielded to subordinate poor communities of color.
2. Regulatory Intersectionality in Action: Section 8 on the Outskirts of
Los Angeles
In a recent article, Professor Ocen described the targeting of Section
8 Housing Choice Voucher program recipients in three California suburban
communities. 130 From her analysis, it is clear that, despite the purported
transportability of the voucher, Section 8 recipients are easily targeted by
communities seeking to stigmatize and exclude them. It is also clear that this
targeting was facilitated through data sharing and was accomplished through
an astoundingly aggressive campaign by multiple punitive agencies in the
communities she analyzes.
The story Ocen tells arose initially from depreciating housing values
in three white suburban communities in California, two (Palmdale and
Lancaster) outside of Los Angeles, and one (Antioch) outside of San
Francisco. As housing prices depreciated, rents went down and properties
128. Memorandum of Understanding, Shocap Procedure, July 15, 2008 (on
file with author).
129. 24 CFR § 5.903 (2017).
130. Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race,
Welfare and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1540 (2012).
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that previously would not have been accessible for households in receipt of
Section 8 started to fall within their price range.131 The response of these
predominantly white communities was swift and hostile. Ocen argues
convincingly that what happened in these three communities represents a
resurgence, in a new form, of racially restrictive covenants.132 Like Michelle
Alexander’s The New Jim Crow,133 this is old subordination in new clothes.
In Lancaster, Palmdale and Antioch resistance to voucher holders
was clearly about both race and poverty. While these communities were
previously demographically fairly homogenously white, the voucher holders
were predominantly African American.134 The communities, in the words of
Lancaster’s mayor went to “war.”135 In Antioch, for example, the initial
response was private, through the formation of “United Citizens for Better
Neighborhoods . . .—an Antioch-based group created ‘to combat problems
associated with Section 8 rentals.’”136 In response to this private activism, the
Antioch Police Department formed a specialized unit, the “Community
Action Team,” the explicit purpose of which was to monitor and police
Section 8 households.137 This regulatory structure was mirrored in Lancaster
and Palmdale. Lancaster established its Lancaster Community Appreciation
Project (LAN-CAP) police team to target multi-family rental properties and
Palmdale created Partners Against Crime.138 In a remarkable example of
regulatory intersectionality, in all three communities, it was explicit purpose
of these police units to monitor families not only for criminal activity (the
traditional purpose of policing) but to monitor for them on issues related to
subsidy eligibility. For example, “a substantial portion of LAN-CAP
officers’ time was . . . devoted to conducting ‘compliance checks’ on Section
8 tenants and encouraging landlords and managers to police their Section 8
tenants.”139
The utter conflation of regulatory functions (policing, child
protection and social welfare benefit compliance) that took place is
astounding. “At least on some occasions the sweeps of Section 8 homes in
131. Id. at 1571.
132. Id. at 1572–81.
133. ALEXANDER, supra note 10.
134. Ocen, supra note 130, at 1571–72.
135. Complaint at ¶ 8, Community Action League v. City of Lancaster, No.
CV 11-4817 ODW (C.D. Cal. Jun. 7, 2011), ECF No. 1.
136. PUB. ADVOCATES INC., POLICING LOW-INCOME AFRICAN-AMERICAN
FAMILIES IN ANTIOCH: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN “COMMUNITY ACTION TEAM”
PRACTICES 10 (2007) (quoting website then maintained by United Citizens for Better
Neighborhoods).
137. Id. at 12.
138. Community Action League, Complaint at ¶ 32.
139. Id.
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Lancaster and Palmdale involve[d] not only Sherriff’s deputies, but also the
Department of Children and Family Services, the Probation Department, and
Code Enforcement officials.”140 Officials regularly used aggressive police
tactics in these raids, appearing with multiple heavily armed officers,
drawing guns and putting household members in handcuffs.
The key to these efforts, in the view of the predominantly white
leaders of these communities, was accessing information about voucher
holders and trying to force termination of subsidies by the local housing
agencies. Both communities worked closely with the relevant local housing
authority to accomplish these ends. For several years Lancaster and Palmdale
paid the housing authority “to hire additional investigators to work with the
local sheriff’s office and focus on eliminating purported Section 8 fraud.”141
Although at various points the local housing agencies chose not to comply
with requests for information, in all three communities the local housing
authorities periodically complied with requests to disclose the identity and
address of voucher holders, took referrals for voucher termination from the
local police and terminated vouchers based on evidence provided by local
officials.142
The overlapping “policing” of subsidy recipients had the intended
effect. “‘[In one year alone in LAN-CAP] over 1,500 arrests were made—
three times the normal apprehension rate. They have trained over 300
property owners and managers on how to spot potential problems and have
performed over 200 Section 8 compliance checks.’”143 Voucher terminations
were referred to the local housing authority at astonishingly high rates and
vouchers were often terminated. Landlords willing to rent to voucher holders
were successfully targeted and officials succeeded in creating a climate to
extreme fear for those who remained. At every step along the way the
negative impact was experienced disproportionately by African American
voucher holders.144
3. Administration at the Top: The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction
and the Local Property Tax Deduction
As Suzanne Mettler describes the submerged state, its mechanisms
are so invisible that many individuals receive benefits without being aware of
the support. 145 Indeed the regulatory mechanisms of housing-related tax
140. Id. at ¶ 38 [pg. 17].
141. Id. at ¶ 9.
142. See id. at ¶¶ 9, 79, 82.
143. Id. at ¶ 32. (alteration in original; quoting website no longer available
for January 2007 City of Lancaster).
144. PUB. ADVOCATES INC., supra note 136, at 2.
145. METTLER, supra note 2, at 37–39.
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deductions and poverty-focused housing support are so dissimilar that it is
almost difficult to make the comparison. There is no special application
process for these deductions nor any in-person appointment. One fills out a
supplementary form as a part of the tax return and provides documentation as
to the interest paid by the homeowner. When the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) receives a return claiming the HMID, the IRS is able to compare the
amount claimed in the return to the information reported by the
mortgagee(s). 146 For the deduction for state and local property taxes,
although home mortgage companies generally collect real property taxes
through escrow and report the amount paid to the homeowner,147 various
challenges prevent a data-matching system as robust as that available for
HMID.148 Of course, the IRS can audit taxpayers regarding either or both the
HMID and their property tax deductions, which may lead to fines.
Even with this possibility, it is clear there is nothing that even begins
to match the information gathering, multi-systemic targeting, surveillance
and punishment systems described above. And in fact, such a set of
mechanisms is, I would argue, culturally unimaginable. Imagine, for
example, the uproar if the juvenile court records of children whose parents
claimed the HMID were pulled by local police and were then used to justify
inspections of the home and denial of the deduction. Imagine a high-income
taxpayer losing his or her home as a result of drug use by a child. Imagine
that tax returns demanded detail about substance use and criminal records for
everyone who lives in your home, and then the IRS sent inspectors to highincome homes to verify occupancy. Imagine further that, if it appeared that
there was an unauthorized person, that high-income taxpayers would lose the
HMID. Imagine police sweeps and task forces targeting deduction recipients.
I would argue that all of this is nothing short of unimaginable. The
146. Internal
Rev.
Serv.
Form
1098,
Copy
A
(2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1098.pdf.
147. Form 1098 does not require reporting of real estate taxes paid. See
Internal Rev. Serv., Instructions to Form 1098, at 6 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1098--2017.pdf (“Box 11 . . . Enter any other item
you wish to report to the payer, such as real estate taxes . . . .”). It appears lenders
may report this information to the taxpayer but not report it to the IRS. The 2016
Instructions to Form 1098 made this explicit. Internal Rev. Serv., Instructions to
Form 1098, at 4 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1098--2016.pdf (“You do
not have to report to the IRS any information provided in this box [for real estate
taxes].).”
148. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REAL ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION: TAXPAYERS FACE
CHALLENGES IN DETERMINING WHAT QUALIFIES; BETTER INFORMATION COULD
IMPROVE
COMPLIANCE
17–19
(May
2009),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/289580.pdf.
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mechanisms of the submerged state share none of the mechanisms of
monitoring, regulation, and punishment that so dominate the hyperregulatory
state.
There is no waiting list nor is there any discretion about what
households should get priority or receive the benefit. These tax breaks are
also granted based on self-reporting and are questioned, if at all, through an
audit or through “calculations on individuals returns that are then compared
and confirmed with third parties.”149
Also interesting to note, and a clear feature of benefits at the top, is
that the HMID and the state and local property tax deduction are created and
sustained through a far simpler, more secure and less visible legislative
process. As Christopher Faricy explains,
tax expenditures pass through fewer committees and face
fewer legislative veto points than does spending passed
through the appropriations process. Therefore, policymakers
from both parties could favor tax expenditures since they are
easier to pass through the legislature and once passed are
more likely to become permanent fixtures of federal
policy.150
These features of the tax provisions focused on in this article contrast
significantly with means-tested benefits and contribute to the comparatively
smaller amount of public scrutiny and far greater cultural legitimacy they
receive.
4. Administration from the Bottom to the Middle: Low and Middle
Income Tax Benefits for Households with Dependent Children.
While the administration of housing support provides a fairly
extreme example of the differences in regulation for benefits at the bottom
and benefits at the top, cash benefits for households with dependent children
exhibit a more gradual progression from the bottom to the middle. While the
TANF program shares many of the administrative characteristics of Section
8 and public housing, with its attendant manifestation of regulatory
intersectionality and hyperregulation, the EITC and CTC move more
gradually toward the administrative structure of the high-income housing
subsidies, with the EITC sharing more characteristics similar to TANF,
Section 8, and public housing, and the CTC functioning somewhere between
149. Id.
150. Id. at 100.
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the EITC and the HMID.
a. Support at the Bottom: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
Like public housing and Section 8, the TANF program is characterized by a
high degree of scrutiny, punitive rules, and extreme risk of exposure to
additional punishment as a condition of benefit receipt. 151 As with the
housing programs, applying for TANF involves a series of face-to-face
appointments with various agency personnel. During the application process
one must disclose a wide range of personal information 152 and subject
oneself to extensive, information-verification procedures. Applicants do not
receive the benefit merely on the criteria that they are income (and asset)
eligible for the benefit. Instead, during the application process and beyond,
they are subject to a wide range of non-income and non-asset related criteria.
Just to give a few examples, applicants are often drug-tested153 and are often
required to participate in pre-benefit receipt work programs.154
In addition, although as a general matter, families receive higher
benefits when there are more children present in the household, in many
jurisdictions, this is not the case. Many states currently have “child
exclusion” or “family cap” policies. These policies exclude families from
receiving additional assistance if their household size increases as the result
151. For an extensive discussion of the hyperregulatory mechanisms
imbedded in TANF and manifested in the growing trend to include welfare drug
testing mandates as part of TANF programs, see Bach, supra note 5.
152. Because of the structure of the program, application processes are
governed by state and local law, regulation and procedure. For an example of an
application form and the requirements for documentation, see Temporary Assistance,
N.Y.
S T.
OFF.
OF
TEMPORARY
&
DISABILITY
ASSISTANCE,
https://otda.ny.gov/programs/temporary-assistance/#apply (last visited Apr. 22,
2017), and the corresponding benefits application form, New York State Application
for Certain Benefits and Services (2016), https://otda.ny.gov/programs/applications/
2921.pdf.
153. For an extensive discussion of drug testing and TANF, see Bach,
supra note 5; Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug
Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751
(2011).
154. In 2009, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. conducted a study of
TANF “diversion” practices across the nation. The term diversion refers to state
policies that attempt to divert applicants from the program. According to that study,
39 states had an applicant work requirement. Twenty required applicants to complete
job search or job readiness programs and 19 required applicants to complete a work
orientation and/or employment plan as part of the application process.
MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., A STUDY OF STATES’ TANF DIVERSION
PROGRAMS:
FINAL
REPORT
5
(2008),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/tanf_diversion.pdf.
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of the birth of a child while the family is receiving benefits.155
Not only is the TANF application process extremely burdensome
and intrusive, but, as Kaaryn Gustafson has persuasively demonstrated, today
“[w]elfare rules assume the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the logics of
crime control now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to
ameliorate its effects.”156 For example, take the use of biometric imaging
technology. The 1996 welfare reform law “required states to institute fraud
prevention programs.”157 Several states instituted a program of biometric
imaging in which, in most cases, applicants’ fingerprints and possibly
photographs are scanned and then run through a variety of state databases,
purportedly to detect instances in which recipients are attempting to “double
dip” by receiving benefits in more than one jurisdiction.158 Even before these
systems were in place, instances of welfare fraud in the form of double
dipping were characterized more by infamous individual instances than by
any data showing a widespread practice. Today, given the extensive system
of data cross-checking now in place, these processes are even more unlikely
to and in fact do not actually uncover significant instances of welfare
fraud. 159 But, as Gustafson observes, biometric imaging “serves another
purpose: the collection of biometric data scrutinizes and stigmatizes lowincome adults in a way that equates poverty with criminality.”160 In these
states, because of the extensive interviewing, data checks, and finger
imaging, “applying for welfare mirrors the experience of being booked for a
crime.”161
In addition, as I have previously argued, applying for and
155. ERIKA HUBER ET AL., WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF
POLICIES AS OF JULY 2014: OPRE REPORT 2015-81, at 238–39 (2015) (Table L10:
Family Cap Policies, 1996–2014).
156. GUSTAFSON, supra note 5, at 1.
157. Id. at 56.
158. Id. at 56–57.
159. For example, in California, the state identifies only three matches per
month and refers only one of these cases per month for more extensive fraud
investigation. Id. at 57. Although policymakers claim that the purpose of these
programs is as much to deter as to detect fraud, there is also extensive evidence that
it deters not fraud but applications of needy individuals. Id. at 56–57. Policymakers
continue to persist in requiring finger imaging despite extraordinary evidence of its
high cost and low utility in detecting fraud. For example, according to a report
evaluating its effectiveness in Texas, it failed to reduce caseloads, cost the taxpayers
$15.9 million between its implementation in 1996 and 2000, and, over the same
period, “resulted in only nine charges filed by the DA, 10 administrative penalty
cases, and 12 determinations of no fraud.” Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 57.
161. Id.
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participating in welfare exposes one to ever more severe potential
consequences. Two examples make this point clearly. First, the increasingly
prevalent requirement that welfare recipients subject themselves to drug
testing as a condition of eligibility, exposes them to punitive intervention by
child welfare and criminal legal system interventions. 162 As one brief
example, consider Florida’s drug-testing law. When implementing that law,
the Florida Department of Children and Families instituted procedures that
included the sharing of positive drug tests with the Florida Abuse Hotline.163
As described by the District Court in its decision enjoining the Florida
program,
DCF shares all positive drug tests for controlled substances
with the Florida Abuse Hotline. . . . After receiving a
positive drug test, a hotline counselor enters a Parent Needs
Assistance referral into a child welfare database known as
the Florida Safe Families Network. . . . [A] referral is then
prepared . . . so that “other appropriate response to the
referral in the particular county of residence of the
applicant” may be taken. . . . [T]he statute governing the
Florida Abuse Hotline authorizes the disclosure of records
from the abuse hotline to “[c]riminal justice agencies of
appropriate jurisdiction,” as well as “[t]he state attorney of
the judicial circuit in which the child resides or in which the
alleged abuse or neglect occurred.” Law enforcement
officials may access the Florida Safe Families Network and
make such use of the data as they see fit.164
Second, consider the prevalent use of mandatory home inspections,
prime examples of which were the regulations and procedures at issue in
Sanchez v. City of San Diego.165 At issue in that case was the San Diego
County’s “Project 100%.” The project was initiated, in 1997, by the San
Diego County District Attorney and required all welfare recipients to submit
162. For an extensive discussion of the extent and nature of this example of
regulatory intersectionality, see Bach, supra note 5.
163. Complaint at 10, Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla.
2011) (No. 6:11 Civ. 01473) (stating that applicants are required to sign a “Drug
Testing Information Acknowledgement and Consent Release” which includes,
among other provisions, that applicants consent that information on a failed test will
be shared with the Florida Abuse Hotline “for review to initiate an assessment or an
offer of services.”).
164. LeBron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).
165. 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
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to a mandatory home inspection as a condition of eligibility.166 As described
by the Ninth Circuit, “Under Project 100%, all applicants receive a home visit
from an investigator employed by the D.A.'s office. The visit includes a ‘walk
through’ to gather eligibility information that is then turned over to eligibility
technicians who compare that information with information supplied by the
applicant.”167
In addition, inspectors from Project 100% were authorized to
prosecute individuals for welfare fraud, and “d[id] make referrals for criminal
investigation, for example, if they discover[ed] evidence of contraband, child
abuse, or a subject with outstanding felony warrants.”168 So not only have
welfare agencies adopted the mechanisms and modalities of the criminal justice
system in the policing of the application and retention of welfare benefits, but
they are part and parcel of a system of intersecting regulatory systems that
expose women and children to the risk of ever-increasing punishment in the
child welfare and criminal law systems. Moreover, as I have laid out in previous
scholarship, the punitive harms associated with these regulatory intersections are
imposed disproportionately on African American women and their children.169
b. Moving Slightly up the Income Scale: The Earned Income Tax Credit.
If one conceptualizes the benefits under discussion as on a continuum from
hyperregulation to near-entitlement, the federal EITC stands above TANF,
Section 8 and public housing but still below the CTC and the housing related
tax credits. Distinguishing it from benefits at the bottom, many features of
the other means-tested benefits are not present. One does not have to apply in
person, supply significant personal information related to non-income, asset
or family composition issues. One also does not see the same kind of explicit
data-sharing arrangements nor does one see explicit risks of interventions by
child protection or criminal law enforcement agencies. In addition, as noted
above, tax benefits in general, and therefore the EITC in particular, bear
certain administrative and funding characteristics that make them less
punitive and also less vulnerable to political attack. As noted above, and as
highlighted by David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, unlike benefits focused
on the bottom of the income scale, “tax expenditures do not require an
annual appropriation (as agency programs do). Rather, they are like direct
expenditures that are automatically appropriated absent some contrary
congressional action.” 170 This difference deprives opponents of a clear

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918.
Id.
Id. at 918 n.3.
Bach, supra note 5.
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29.
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legislative target and makes it slightly more difficult to oppose retention and
expansion of these benefits.
In addition, when one moves from the benefits discussed above to
benefits embedded in the tax code, there is a quite radical shift in the way the
various agencies conceptualize and pursue error. The very words used—
“welfare fraud” v. “undercollection”—suggests this contrast, implying that
those who receive TANF benefits for which they are ineligible are frauds or
cheats while those who fail to pay taxes due are somehow less to blame. But
the distinctions go far beyond words. In fact, as Weisbach and Nussim point
out in their comparison of mechanisms for error detection and administration
between the EITC and what was then called the Food Stamp Program (and is
now SNAP), the differences boil down not to different rates of error but to
how much each agency spends on benefits versus administration in order to
accomplish these outcomes. In short, the Department of Agriculture, which
administers SNAP, spends far more resources on administration than the IRS
does on the EITC, leading to far lower overpayment rates.
To get a sense of these differences, consider that in 1998 it cost
about $4 billion or about 19% of all program costs to administer SNAP171
and the program served about 8 million households. Although the IRS does
not provide data by tax provision for administration, to get some sense of the
contrast, in the same year the entire IRS budget was $7.3 billion and the IRS
served 122 million individuals and 5 million corporations.172 Clearly, due to
a variety of significant differences in administration, SNAP is far more
expensive to administer than the entire tax system.173
In large part as a result of the resources and agency focus on
preventing ineligible households from receiving SNAP, the program has a
very low erroneous payment rate, estimated to be about 3.42% in 2013.174 In
contrast, the EITC has a comparatively higher erroneous payment rate, about
24% in that year.175 The Department of Housing and Urban Development,
171. In 1998 the program was actually called the Food Stamps Program. It
changed names in 2008 to Supplemental Assistance to Needy Families or SNAP. For
ease of analysis, I refer throughout this article to the program as SNAP even when,
in the years under consideration, it was known as Food Stamps. A Short History of
SNAP, FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., (Nov. 20. 2014),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap.
172. Janet Holtzblatt, Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and
Spending Programs, 93 PROC., ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N OF NAT’L TAX ASS’N 116, 121
(2000).
173. See also FARICY, supra note 3, at 103.
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-87R, IMPROPER
PAYMENTS: INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTING OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE UNDER THE
IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT 14 (2014).
175. Id. Current EITC error rates are similar. See Fraud, EITC CENTRAL,
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which administers public housing and Section 8 reports a similarly low
improper payment rate of 4.3% in those programs.176 This again brings back
McClusky’s notion that these issues come down, in the end, to value
judgments. The question is not whether we are willing as a society, to
tolerate error. We clearly are. Instead it is how we balance the kinds of errors
we tolerate and the resources we spend to prevent the errors that raise the
most concern in the. Clearly as a society we view these questions very
differently when it comes to more traditional poverty benefits than we do for
benefits administered through the tax code.
Nevertheless, the EITC is significantly more punitive than other tax
benefits and bears striking similarities to the administration of benefits like
TANF. These contrasts and similarities bear out in three basic areas: the use
family caps and work requirements, the rate of audits, and the use of punitive
sanctions. Equally striking are correlations between harsher policies and
race, which echo the race politics of welfare and consistent scholarly,
congressional and outside advocacy actions designed to attempt to push the
EITC into the administrative mechanisms more characteristic of other
means-tested benefits through a characterization of the EITC as “welfare.”
i. The EITC: Family Caps and Work Requirements. Prior to 1996, a
family’s AFDC benefit was determined by, among other factors, the size of
the household.177 Each child in the household added a very small additional
amount to the family’s AFDC allotment. After 1996, with repeal of AFDC
and enactment of TANF states were no longer required to provide additional
benefits when the household size increased.178 Since that time, many states
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/Tax-Preparer-Toolkit/faqs/fraud (last updated Sept. 23,
2016) (“IRS estimates that between 21 percent to 26 percent of EITC claims are paid
in error.”).
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 14.
177. Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive
Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 152–53 (2006)
(noting that under AFDC, “states were required to obtain waivers from the federal
government to implement policies such as family caps because they violated the
Social Security Act by incorporating eligibility criteria based on behavior”).
178. Id. at 153–54 (“The final version of TANF . . . did not require states to
implement caps, but instead, by remaining silent, allowed states to continue utilizing
existing family cap policies or enact new caps without federal oversight.”). In fact,
states were not even required to have individual benefit programs. They were merely
required, as a condition of receipt of federal TANF funds, to institute programs that
met the overall purposes of the federal program. Despite this latitude in federal law,
all states retained some kind of cash or cash-equivalent benefit program for
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have implemented caps on budget size that do not rise upon the arrival of
additional household members179 Although the constitutionality of those
provisions was challenged on both federal and state constitutional grounds,
those challenges failed and multiple states instituted these provisions.180
Another central feature of TANF that contrasted strongly with
AFDC was its unrelenting emphasis on work. Although state and local
programs had been experimenting with work programs before 1996,
PRWORA instituted an aggressive national set of work requirements,
requiring nearly every adult on welfare to engage in significant work
activities and allowing states to mete out harsh penalties for the failure to
comply with these requirements.181
Like TANF, the federal EITC contains both a family cap and a work
requirement. Although the EITC increases for households with between zero
and three children, it is capped at that point. Like the TANF family cap,182
the maximum benefit is provided to households with three “or more”
children.183 Also like welfare, the EITC contains a work requirement. One
can only receive the EITC if one receives work income. Families receiving
equivalent incomes from other sources, for example, Social Security

households with dependent children.
179. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
180. Smith, supra note177, at 180–90.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2017) (last amended 2012); see also Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104-193,
§ 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2129 (1996).
182. There are some contrasts in the way these provisions work. A family
cap generally functions slightly differently, capping benefits on children that enter
the family while the household is in receipt of benefits:
Benefits to recipients who give birth to a child while receiving aid
may or may not be affected by the addition of the child to the
assistance unit. Traditionally, when a child is born to a member of
an assistance unit, the benefit increases to meet the needs of the
new child; however, many states have changed this policy. Family
cap policies, as most states refer to them, prevent or limit an
increase in a family’s benefit when another child is born. In these
states, the benefit increase an assistance unit would otherwise
receive for adding another member to the unit will be limited.
Some states provide a percentage of the increase to the unit, while
others provide no additional funds to the unit for the addition of a
child.
HUBER ET AL., supra note 155, at 152; see also id. at 174–175, 238–39 (family cap
tables).
183. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1); 2017 EITC Income Limits, supra note 96.
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Disability, are not eligible for the benefit. As discussed below184 and as noted
by Dorothy Brown, 185 these features are not present in the CTC, a tax
expenditure program that benefits slightly higher income families.
ii. Error Rates, Audit Rates and Sanctions. There is no question that
the EITC erroneous payment rate is significant, “with estimates ranging from
the low to high 20% range”186 of returns claiming the EITC.187 There is also
no question that the audit rates for the EITC are very high. As Susan Kamic
Takh explains, “claiming the EITC doubles a taxpayer's chances of an
audit.”188 In addition, in an era of declining resources for tax collection, both
Congress and the IRS have repeatedly dedicated significant resources to
EITC audits.
While these facts are clear, what is less clear is the rationale for
dedicating IRS resources to these errors, over potentially more significant
sources of revenue collection. For example, as Nina Olsen, the National
Taxpayer Advocate, points out, the EITC error rate pales in comparison to
the error in other portions of the tax code. Citing IRS data, she notes that,
“EITC overclaims account for just seven percent of gross individual income
tax compliance, while business income underreported by individuals
accounts for $51.9%”, or $122 billion in lost revenue. 189 In light of such
data, it is fair to suggest that the dedication of IRS resources to the EITC,
over other sources of error, is a waste of IRS resources. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office has noted, that the focus on the EITC is
misplaced given the far larger sources of revenue potentially available if
audit and collection resources were focused on other sources of error.190 For
example, in contrast to the 20% error rate for the EITC, “studies estimate that
cash basis self-employed persons report only 11% to 19% of their income,
184. See infra Part III.B.4.c.
185. Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but
Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 757–58 (2005).
186. Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173,
1196 (2012–2013).
187. Id.
188. Tahk, supra note 29, at 844–45 (citing Michelle Lyon Drumbl).
189. The National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations, H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 25 & n.83 (2015) (written statement of Nina E. Olson,
National Taxpayer Advocate).
190. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS
COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT
RESOURCES 8 (2012) (“[E]xams (both correspondence and field) of taxpayers with
positive incomes of at least $200,000 produced significantly more direct revenue per
dollar of cost than exams of lower income taxpayers.”).
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and that all self-employed taxpayers underreport income by 57%,
representing more than 27% of the most recent estimates of the tax gap.”191
Finally, pursuing tax errors by higher income households also yields
significantly higher revenues. As Francine Lippman points out, “[w]hile less
than one-quarter as many examinations were conducted of tax returns with
income from $200,000 to $1 million, those examinations generated more tax
revenue than examinations of EITC filers.”192
The EITC is also characterized by severe sanctions. Taxpayers who
fraudulently claim the EITC cannot receive EITC benefits for ten years.193 A
claim made with “reckless or intentional disregard of rules” results in a twoyear ban.194 Sanctions like this are virtually unheard of in the tax code,
although beginning in 2016 parallel sanctions apply to the CTC.195 In fact,
“[t]here are no analogous sanctions applicable to other improper positions
taken on federal income tax returns.”196
c. Moving to the Middle: The Child Tax Credit. For the question of
administration at issue in this section, the CTC functions on the continuum
between the EITC and the HMID. As is the case for the HMID, one fills out
a fairly simple IRS form and receives the credit based on the assertions on
191. Lipman, supra note 186, at 1193–94.
192. Lipman, supra note 186, at 1195.
193. I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i). A similar rule was added to the CTC by the
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), Pub. L. No. 114113, Div. Q, § 208(a)(1), 129 Stat. 3040, 3083 (codified at I.R.C. § 24(g)).
194. I.R.C. §32(k)(1)(B)(ii). A parallel rule was added to the CTC for
taxable years beginning in 2016. I.R.C. § 24(g); PATH Act, § 208(c).
195. PATH Act, § 208(a)–(c).
196. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1867, 1894 (2005) (“There are no analogous
sanctions applicable to other improper positions taken on federal income tax returns.
If an underpayment of income tax is due to negligence or to a ‘substantial
understatement’ of tax liability on a return, the taxpayer is generally subject to a
penalty equal to 20 percent of the underpayment. Even if an underpayment is due to
fraud, the penalty is only 75 percent of the underpayment. Aside from the special
EITC sanctions, an improper claim of a deduction, credit, or exclusion on one year's
return never makes a taxpayer ineligible to claim the same tax benefit in a later year.
No matter how culpable a taxpayer was in wrongfully claiming a charitable
deduction or a dependency exemption in one year, the taxpayer is not foreclosed
from claiming the deduction or the exemption in a future year in which the taxpayer
satisfies the substantive requirements. The draconian EITC sanctions, and the
absence of any similar sanctions for improper income tax return positions not
involving the EITC, suggest that Congress considers overpayments of the EITC to
be much worse than underpayments of income tax.”); see also Lipman, supra note
186, at 1196 (quoting Zelenak).
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that form.197 Unlike the EITC, there is no work requirement, no cap on the
number of children on behalf of whom filers can receive the benefit and no
unusually high audit rates associated with the benefit. On the other hand, as
of 2016, the imposition of two or ten year bans for “reckless or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations” or “fraud” respectively, previously found
only for the EITC, apply to the CTC as well.198 In this sense, the CTC, a
benefit targeted toward and received by those largely in the middle of the
income spectrum, functions as a matter of administration somewhere
between the EITC and the HMID.
5. Race, Welfare, the EITC and the CTC
In an article that contrasts the administration of the EITC with the
CTC, Dorothy Brown argues that the comparatively harsher sanctions and
audit rates between the EITC and the CTC can only be explained by the
perceived race of EITC recipients.199 While the IRS’s failure to collect data
on the race of taxpayers makes it nearly impossible to conclusively study the
racial impact of particular tax policies,200 Brown makes a strong case that the
association of the EITC with “welfare” is code for race and provides a
justification for the comparatively harsher policies described above.201
There is no question that, despite the lack of any significant period of
time in which more African Americans than whites received either AFDC or
TANF, both programs are strongly associated with African Americans.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the image of the “welfare queen”
dominated public discourse around AFDC and ultimately became the
symbolic force justifying the elimination of the program. Still today the
image of the welfare queen continues to powerfully stigmatize poor, African
American women. 202
More recently, the EITC has come under sustained attack with the
same racially charged images. For example, in the Heritage Foundation 2015
197. I.RC. § 24; Internal Rev. Serv., Schedule 8812 (Form 1040A or 1040)
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040s8.pdf.
198. See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text.
199. Brown, supra note 185, at 757 (“This Article seeks to uncover why
there is a need for two tax credits which benefit children differently and concludes
that the only plausible explanation is related to race.”).
200. Knauer, supra note 24, at 210.
201. Brown, supra note 185, at 801–39.
202. For an important discussion of these issues in the context of welfare
and beyond to other poverty issues, see Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads and Welfare
Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014);
Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black Mothers in the Age of
Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363 (2016).
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Budget Book, Robert Rector described the EITC as, “the nation’s largest
means-tested cash welfare program” and refers to the portion of the EITC
paid in excess of a household’s tax liability as “simply a cash welfare
grant.”203 Similarly, Ernest Istook, President American for Less Regulation,
in a 2015 article in the Washington Times states, highlighted the EITC error
rate and decried the lack of congressional focus on the issue. He does so by
explicitly invoking Ronald Reagan’s push against “welfare cheats”:
“Inexcusably, there is no major push within Congress or the White House to
fix this. Ronald Reagan successfully ran for president by decrying the
‘welfare cheats.’ Now the problem is far more massive, yet gets ignored.”204
If should now be clear, however, that structurally the payment Istook
is referring to is no different, from a budgetary perspective, than a CTC or
the HMID. The labeling of it is “welfare” and the clear invocation of race
politics in these arguments is nothing more than an attempt to sustain
structural inequlaities between those who deserve benefits (taxpayers) and
those that don’t (poor people). As McClusky suggests, these are, at base,
nothing more than value judgments.205

IV. S TRUCTURING E QUALITY : A P ATH T OWARD R EFORM
Dorothy Roberts has written extensively on the devastation wrought
upon poor African American families by various government systems: the
child welfare,206 the social welfare, and the criminal justice systems.207 In the
face of this devastation, she makes an argument about the nature of a right to
privacy, a right clearly central to sustaining autonomy. Roberts argues that in
order to “protect the dignity and autonomy of the poor and oppressed” poor
women need a right to privacy that not only offers protection from incursion
(the classic negative rights request of liberalism) but also affirmative
support. 208 As she frames it, it is not enough to “merely [ensure] the

203. The Budget Book: 106 Ways to Reduce the Size & Scope of
Government, #93 Reduce Fraud in the Earned Income Tax Credit, HERITAGE
FOUND.,
http://budgetbook.heritage.org/income-security/reduce-fraud-earnedincome-tax-credit/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
204. Ernest Istook, Needed: Watchdogs over Waste, Misguided Payments,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/8/ern
est-istook-earned-income-tax-credits-massive-fr/.
205. McClusky, supra note 13.
206. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 13–14 (2002).
207. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012).
208. Roberts, supra note 11, at 1478.
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individual’s ‘right to be let alone.’”209 A better notion of privacy, Roberts
argues, “includes not only the negative proscription against government
coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to protect the
individual’s personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of
choice and self-determination.”210
Although, as I have previously argued,211 the work of Roberts and
Martha Fineman differ in many respects, their work comes together on the
idea of autonomy enhancing support.212 Dramatically upending classic liberal
theory, Fineman argues that, in place of the traditional autonomous subject
we need to think of the human subject as inherently vulnerable, inherently in
need.213 We may be more or less so at different moments in life, but each of
us has needs that we cannot meet alone. Vulnerability theory, in Fineman’s
analysis, is certainly descriptive, but it is not merely descriptive. Instead it
forms the basis of a claim that state institutions must provide support:
[C]onsideration of vulnerability brings societal institutions,
in addition to the state and individual, into the discussion
and under scrutiny . . . . The nature of human vulnerability
forms the basis for a claim that the state must be more
responsive to that vulnerability. It fulfills that responsibility
primarily through the establishment and support of societal
institutions.214
For Fineman, this theory does hard work. If the “primary objective
[were] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of opportunity and
access, we may see a need for a more active and responsive state.”215 This
envisioned state would not “simply protect citizens’ individual rights from
violation by others.”216 Instead, it would “actively support the expanded list
of liberal goods by creating institutions that facilitate caretaking and human
development.”217 This envisioned state would also move past constrained
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1479.
211. Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1077–
79 (2015).
212. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, including not only an
extensive discussion of Fineman’s theory but also the important work of Maxine
Eichner, see Bach, supra note 5.
213. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 4; Fineman, Responsive
State, supra note 4.
214. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 4, at 255–56.
215. Id. at 260.
216. EICHNER, supra note 4.
217. Id.
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notions of formal equality towards a much more robust and substantive
demand on state institutions to create the possibility for real equality. The
“primary objective [would be] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality
of opportunity.” 218 Like Roberts’ call for a notion of personhood that
includes the right to support that “facilitate[s] the processes of choice and
self-determination,” 219 Fineman’s theory demands autonomy-enhancing
support.
To move toward an autonomy-enhancing state, though, as scholars
like Wacquant and McClusky suggest, one first must understand how
structural institutions facilitate both subordination and privilege.220 At the
specific site of public benefits provision, this paper has sought to trace these
structural inequalities. At this point several points should be clear. The U.S.
social welfare state is more extensive than popular discourse might suggest,
largely as a result of certain tax provisions that benefit those with substantial
wealth. Further the U.S. social welfare state does less than other comparable
nations to address income inequality. But structural support of inequality in
the U.S. social welfare system goes beyond these size and distributive issues.
As this article has demonstrated, inequality is also significantly exacerbated
through the means of administration. Benefits at the bottom are dominated
by hyperregulation, and benefits at the top function as nearly invisible
entitlements. These two parts of the social welfare state, while making up
significant pieces of one whole, could not look more different. And, as a
result, they could not be experienced more differently by their beneficiaries.
Through both distribution and structural administrative inequalities, the U.S.
social welfare state both sustains privilege and subordinates those at the
bottom.
To move toward an autonomy enhancing state that provides
meaningful equality of opportunity at the site of social welfare provision, one
has to address both the distributive and the structural issues at play. As to
distribution, this article joins the calls of other scholars and policy analysts
who envision both an increase in overall spending and a far more progressive
distribution of U.S. social welfare dollars. To take the example of the tax
provisions discussed above, this would entail seriously questioning the
existence of these provisions. It would also involve confronting head on the
overall effect of social welfare provision on income inequality. As argued
above, if the goal is addressing income inequality and creating equality of
opportunity, we must both increase and redirect resources in a far more
progressive direction. Addressing this distributive question is a central part
218. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 4, at 260.
219. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 309 (2d Vintage Books ed. 2017).
220. See McClusky, supra note 13; Wacquant, supra notes 5–6.
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of achieving a responsive state.
As to the structural issues, although there is no question that many of
the policy provisions that this paper has characterized as benefits for the
wealthy are ripe for reconsideration and possible elimination, examining
their structure through the lens of an autonomy enhancing state yields
important insights. Suzanne Mettler’s work gives us a window into how
these programs function to support the autonomy of their recipients. Mettler
performed a survey to gain insight into how individuals viewed receipt of
assistance under these programs. Although respondents in her surveys
readily acknowledged their use of tax provisions like the HMID or the CTC
as well as other benefits, at that same time they largely responded that they
did not receive government assistance.221 The programs were, in this sense,
“submerged” or invisible to their recipients as support. Recipients clearly felt
entitled to that support. And the administrative mechanisms of these
programs support that notion of entitlement. Programs for the wealthy are as
unintrusive as possible and the focus of administration appears to be not on
ferreting out fraud but instead on ensuring receipt for the greatest number of
eligible recipients.222 In contrast benefits for the poor are clearly viewed, by
recipients and by the greater culture, as what Mettler called “government
assistance” or more colloquially as a “handout” or “welfare,” with all the
cultural stigma and hyperregulatory administrative mechanisms that those
terms invoke and demand.
To address these structural issues, we need to seriously consider
importing the administrative mechanisms for getting benefits to the top into
the programs focused on those lower on the income scale. To give just a
sense of the necessary reforms, this would involve radically simplifying
application procedures and requirements and eliminating stigmatizing and
hyperregulatory features. As is the case for programs like the HMID and the
CTC, eligibility factors would be limited to far fewer factors: principally
income eligibility and, when necessary, family composition. As is the case
for the tax benefits discussed herein, applications would be submitted in the
ways most convenient to recipients and benefits would be received upon
sworn eligibility. Error detection processes would move from pre-application
processes to processes more consistent with auditing. As is the case for the
EITC (to some extent) and the CTC, the focus of error detection would shift
dramatically. Resources would be focused far more strongly on eliminating
non-receipt for eligible families rather than on detecting and eliminating
receipt by non-eligible families. Although there is good reason to provide
work as well as other supports to those in poverty,223 the linking of work
221. METTLER, supra note 2, at 41–46.
222. See supra Part III.B.3.
223. For a discussion of the kind of support that might yield significant
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programs and employment, as well as other behavioral requirements such as
the passing of drug tests and the linking of service provision to government
benefits would be eliminated. Eliminated too would be all the administrative
structures that lead to enhanced risk. Building significant privacy protection
into the programs that address both formal and informal data-sharing
practices, would take place. As a result of these reforms, recipients would
ultimately experience these benefits as nearly-invisible, autonomy-enhancing
supports. They would perhaps not even realize that they were receiving
assistance at all.
Conclusion
This article began with what I characterized as an unthinkable, and
now more fully developed, scenario: a wealthy family receiving the HMID
subject to the administrative structures that dominated the Section 8 program
in Lancaster and Palmdale. In closing I want to conjure the converse, perhaps
even more culturally unthinkable scenario: a Section 8 recipient subject only
to the administrative structures of the HMID. If one accepts the premises at
the heart of this paper—that a dollar of social welfare provision is a dollar of
social welfare provision regardless of who receives that benefit and that
social welfare policy must be designed to support the autonomy of
recipients—then there is little to justify the structural differences described in
this paper. And this is precisely the point: if we are to have a responsive state
that supports individuals in ways that enhance their autonomy and enables
them to achieve substantive equality, we have to not only get more support to
those in poverty but we must provide that support in way that enhances,
rather than undermines, the autonomy of those in need.

positive results for poor communities see, for example, Wendy A. Bach, What if
Your Child Were The Next One in the Door: Reimagining the Social Safety Net for
Children, Families and Communities, in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: TOTAL
REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM (Nancy Dowd ed., 2016) (discussing the work of
the Harlem Children’s Zone as a promising model for positive reform). See also
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS 166 (2014) (discussing the promising results of the nurse family
partnership a voluntary, health and well-being focused problem for pregnant and
new mothers).
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